The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings Muddle by Karkkainen, Bradley C.
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1See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL.
L. REV. 561, 561-63 (1984) (stating that takings law is characterized by “confusion” as courts pursue the
“elusive[] . . . meaning of ‘taking’ in our law”); Steven J. Eagle. Substantive Due Process and Regulatory
Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1070 (2000) (“outsiders have pronounced the Court’s
property jurisprudence incoherent, and some of the Justices have been kinder only in form”); John D.
Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of Doctrinal
Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695, 695 (1993) (labeling takings doctrine a “confused body of law containing
contradictory principles and standards”).
2Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).   The Penn Central Court traced
the “regulatory takings” puzzle to the 1922 case Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
(hereinafter Mahon), in which Justice Holmes famously opined that “if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.”  This Article joins Robert Brauneis and others in arguing that Mahon was not a
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Fifth Amendment Takings case at all, but rather a Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process case.
See infra Part IV. See also Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’
Jurisprudence”: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes’ Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
106 Yale L.J 613 (1996). 
3
“. . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  U.S. Const.,
Amdt. V.
4Representative cases by the states’ highest courts include: Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v.
John D. Nix, Jr., Enterprises, 117 So. 720, 723 (La. 1928) (“Everyone holds his property, under the
Constitution, subject to a legitimate exercise of the police power”); Appeal of White, 134 A. 409 (Pa.
1926) (“No matter how seemingly complete our scheme of private ownership may be under our system of
government, all property is held in subordination to the right of its reasonable regulation by the
government clearly necessary to preserve the health, safety, or morals of the people”); Ingram v. Brooks,
111 A. 209, 212 (Conn. 1920) (“all property is held subject to this [police] power”); Schiller Piano Co. v.
Illinois Northern Utilities Co., 123 N.E. 631, 632 (Ill. 1919) (“All property in a state is held on the
implied condition or obligation that the owner will so use it as not to interfere with the rights of others
and subject to such reasonable regulations as the Legislature may impose” under the “police power of the
state”); Schmitt v. F.W. Cook Brewing Company, 120 N.E. 19, 20 (Ind. 1918) (“there can be no property
rights which are not subject to this [police] power”);. State ex rel. Euclid-Doan Bldg. Co. v. Cunningham,
119 N.E. 361, 362 (Oh. 1918) (under the police power, “in the interest of public welfare a property owner
must submit to a reasonable regulation and limitation of the use of his property, and, in matters of such
character, when private interests and public welfare conflict, the former must give way to the latter”;
“[s]uch regulations are in no wise an invasion of property rights”); People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343, 345
(N.Y. 1888) (“all property is held under the general police power of the state to regulate and control its
use in a proper case as to secure the general safety and the public welfare”);  Pool v. Trexler, 76 N.C. 297
(N.C. 1877) (“Every citizen holds his land subservient to such police regulation as the Legislature in its
wisdom may enact for the general welfare”);  Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 
3
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(Mass. 1851) (“every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of
the community”).
5Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATC Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that “a
permanent physical occupation authorized by the government is a taking without regard to the
governmental interest it may serve”).
6Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-31 (1992) (holding that
regulations that “eliminate all economically viable use” of land are “inconsistent with the historical
compact recorded in the Takings Clause”).  By its terms, Lucas limits this per se “total taking” test to
property in land.  See id.   For other forms of property, such as personal property, some other analysis is
required.  See id. (distinguishing Andrus v. Allard in which the Court held a  regulation of trade in eagle
feathers that resulted in total loss of economic value of plaintiff’s feather collection not to be a
compensable “taking”).
7See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29 (stating that notwithstanding the per se “total takings” rule, a
regulation authorizing a permanent easement or denying all economically viable use of land may be non-
compensable if it reflects a “limitation” that “inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership”). 
8See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987) (holding that when
the government conditions regulatory approval upon the surrender of a valuable property right that if
appropriated directly would constitute a compensable “taking,” the condition must have an “essential
nexus” to the purpose of the regulatory scheme).
9See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that when the government
conditions regulatory approval upon the surrender of a valuable property right, it “must make some kind
of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
4
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impact of the proposed development”).
10See Penn Central Transp. Co, v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that factors of
“particular significance” in regulatory takings analysis are the “economic impact on the claimant,” the
“extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and “the
character of the governmental action”).  Arguably, the Penn Central opinion itself does not expressly
articulate a balancing test.  Instead, it states that “takings” inquiries are “essentially ad hoc” and “case-
specific,” and identifies some of the factors prominent in the analysis. See id. at 123-24.  Subsequent
cases, however, have interpreted the Penn Central factors as a balancing test, pitting the legitimacy and
importance of the governmental interest on one side of the ledger, against the burden on the property
owner and deprivation of investment-backed expectations on the other side.  See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Authority, 216 F.3d 764, 772-74 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d,
535 U.S. 302 (2002) (characterizing the Penn Central factors as a “test” in which regulatory takings
claims are “resolved by balancing the public and private interests at stake, with three primary factors
weighing in the balance”).
11See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (“The application of a general zoning law to
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests . . .or denies an owner economically viable use of his land”).  For an application of Agins, see,
e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1987) (citing Agins to
uphold a state statute requiring coal mines to provide subjacent support to surface property, on grounds
that the regulation advances a legitimate governmental interest in public safety and does not deny coal
owners all economically viable use).
12See John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1006
(2003) (stating that takings law is “unpredictable in application”); Eric T. Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings,
Methodically, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10313, 10313 (2001) (hereinafter Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings)
(regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . has become an ungainly body, awkward for citizens and judges to
apply”).
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13See id. (stating that takings law is “lacking in theory”); Eagle, supra note 1, at 979-80 (“the
Court has been unwilling to vindicate . . . [property] rights through a coherent theory”).
14See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of “creat[ing]
simultaneously a new categorical rule and a new exception . . . neither of which is rooted in our prior
case law, common law, or common sense” and “question[ing] the Court’s wisdom in issuing sweeping
new rules to decide such a narrow case”).
15See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (decided in part 6-3 and in part 5-4,
with two concurring opinions, two dissents, and one partial concurrence and partial dissent).  Part II-B
provided the crucial holding that a regulatory takings claim is not barred by the fact that the regulation
was already in force at the time the property was acquired.   That Part was decided 5-4, but Justices
O’Connor and Scalia filed separate concurrences stating incompatible interpretations of the crucial
holding.  Compare Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-33 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the holding in
Part II-B does not state a blanket rule making the timing of the regulation irrelevant to takings analysis),
with id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that his “understanding” of Part II-B “is not Justice
O’Connor’s,” insofar as “the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title . . .should
have no bearing” on the takings analysis).
16See   ; see also Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (acknowledging that the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence “is characterized
by essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries . . designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all the
relevant circumstances”)(citations omitted).
17See Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings, supra note , at 10313 (“leading decisions have arisen from
peculiar facts and messy procedural contexts, yielding rulings that are hard to apply elsewhere”).
18See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (Scalia, J.) (“if the protection against physical appropriations
of private property . . . [is] to be meaningfully enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of
interests included in the ownership of property . . . [is] necessarily constrained by constitutional limits”)
19See id. at 1015 (acknowledging that neither Mahon nor more than 70 years of subsequent
jurisprudence established a “set formula” for determining when a regulation constituted a taking );
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (“Since Mahon, we have given some, but not too specific, guidance to courts
confronted with deciding whether a particular government action goes too far and effects a regulatory
taking”). 
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20Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
21See infra, TAN
22Prominent academic efforts to bring order to takings law include, inter alia: RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Joseph L. Sax.
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964);  Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967) [hereinafter Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness]; Lawrence E. Blume & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984) Andrea L.
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I—A Critique of Current Takings
Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles Part II—Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral
Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9
CONST. COMMENTARY 279 (1992); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993).
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23See Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas as Judicial
Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1993) [hereinafter Michelman, Property and Federalism].
24Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) [hereinafter Chicago
B & Q].
25See, e.g., Penn Central, 428 U.S. at 122  (citing Chicago B & Q for the proposition that the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause “is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
26Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,  260 U.S. 393 (1922).
27See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 325 (2002) (stating that Justice Holmes’ opinion in Mahon “gave birth to our regulatory takings
jurisprudence”).
28
“ . . . [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . . . .”  U.S. Const., Amdt. XIV, Sec. 1.  In an important doctrinal development, however, the
Supreme Court held in 1954 that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause applies to the
federal government through a process of “reverse incorporation” by way of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (extending Brown v. Board of
Education’s prohibition on racially segregated public schools to the District of Columbia on Fifth
Amendment Due Process grounds). 
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29Chicago B & Q, 166 U.S. at 236 (“Due process of law, as applied to judicial proceedings
instituted for the taking of private property for public use means. therefore, such process as recognizes
the right of the owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from him and transferred to the
public.”)
30See infra Part
31See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment Just Compensation clause applies only to the federal government). 
32See infra notes   and accompanying text
33See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (stating that in
Fifth Amendment Takings claims against the United States “we need not have recourse to natural equity .
. . for in this fifth amendment there is stated the exact limitation on the power of the government to take
private property for public uses”).  
34See Chicago B & Q, 166 U.S. at 237-36 (quoting with approval earlier justifications of the just
compensation principle as a matter of “natural equity” and “universal law”).
35Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 93 (1908).
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36See Brauneis, supra note   , at     .   The core holding of Mahon is that Pennsylvania’s Kohler
Act requiring mine operators to reserve pillars of coal to provide subjacent support to surface owners fell
outside the scope of the state’s police power, and therefore effected a compensable deprivation of
property under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (“The
question is whether the police power can be stretched so far”); id. at 414 (“It is our opinion that the act
cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power”).   Holmes’ opinion does make a single passing
reference to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, but only to note that it broadly parallels the
Fourteenth Amendment just compensation principle at issue in Mahon.  See 260 U.S. at 415 (stating that
the Fifth Amendment “provides that [property] shall not be taken for [public] use without compensation”
and that “a similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment”).    See also
infra Part   . 
37See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 116, 125 (1876) (upholding railroad rate regulation against
complain that it unconstitutionally deprived railroads of property without Due Process, on grounds that
“statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, or private property [do not] necessarily deprive[]
an owner of his property without due process . . . .Under some circumstances they may, but not under
all”).
38See, e.g., City of Pittsburg v. Alco Parking Co., 417 U.S. 369 (1974) (upholding 20% city tax
on parking against claim that it was so unreasonably high and confiscatory as to constitute an
unconstitutional “taking” or deprivation of parking operators’ property without due process of law); Dean
v. Gadsden Times Pub. Corp., 412 U.S. 543 (1973) (upholding Alabama statute requiring employers to
pay employees regular compensation during jury duty against claim that statute was an unconstitutional
“taking” depriving employer of property without Due Process).    The Alco and Dean cases were decided
strictly on Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process grounds and make no mention of the Fifth
Amendment.   
39See, e.g., Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (describing Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment just compensation principle as “similar”);  
40See, e.g.,    .  See also infra Part   and cases cited therein.
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41See, e.g., Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40, 44-48 (1960) (holding that otherwise lawful federal action to
take title to uncompleted ships from a bankrupt shipbuilder effected a compensable Fifth Amendment
taking of materialmen’s liens recognized as property under Maine law); Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
U.S., 148 U.S. at 336  (“like the other powers granted to congress by the constitution, the power to
regulate commerce is subject to all limitations imposed by such instrument, and among them is that of the
fifth amendment”).
42See, e.g.    .  See also infra Part    .
43See       .  See also infra Part
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44See, e.g.   .  See also infra Part  
45See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44-48 (1960) ( holding that federal action to
take title to uncompleted ships from a bankrupt shipbuilder destroyed the value of materialman’s liens
recognized as property rights under Maine law, effecting a compensable taking under the Fifth
Amendment).   Federal laws applicable to the District of Columbia and other federal territories were an
exception to this general principle, however, insofar as the federal government did have a general police
power over these jurisdictions but was nonetheless bound by the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.  See,
e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (upholding wartime rent control in the District of
Columbia as a legitimate exercise of the police power).  And Congress’ plenary power over public lands
has been held to be “analogous to,” if not altogether coextensive with, the states’ police power.  See
Camfield v. United States, 167  U.S. 518, 525 (“The general government doubtless has a power over its
own property analogous to the police power of the several states, and the extent to which it may go in the
exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case”); id. at 525-26 (“While we
do not undertake to say that congress has the unlimited power to regulate against nuisances within a state
which it would have within a territory, we do not think the admission of a territory as a state deprives it
of the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the
exercise of what is ordinarily known as the ‘police power,’ so long as such power is directed solely to its
own protection”).  
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46The majority opinion in Penn Central drew indiscriminately on Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process cases and Fifth Amendment Just Compensation clause cases, attempting to weave them into a
coherent narrative of a unified “takings” jurisprudence.  See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-28 (citing
eight Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cases against the United States and 18 Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process cases against states or their subdivisions).   No previous Supreme Court case had so
thoroughly conflated the two lines of cases.  Compare Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
593-94 (1962) (citing six Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process cases for the controlling legal
principle that if a restrictive town ordinance “is otherwise a valid exercise of the town’s police powers,
the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional”), with
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (citing seven Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cases
against the United States for controlling legal principles applicable in a Fifth Amendment case against
the United States).   The Armstrong Court did cite Mahon in passing, however, without explaining the
significance of that reference.  See 364 U.S. at 48.   
47See infra Part VI.
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48See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 (1964) (Brennan, J) (characterizing Chicago B & Q as
a precursor to subsequent extensions of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process to rights guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148  (White, J.) (stating that “many of the rights
guaranteed by the first eight amendments have been held to be protected against state action by the Due
Process Clause,” and citing Chicago B & Q for the proposition that this includes  “the right to
compensation for property taken by the State”).
49See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
50See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 122 (citing Chicago B & Q for the proposition that the “takings”
clause of the Fifth Amendment “of course is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
51I use the term “incorporation” throughout this Article in the strong sense in which the Supreme
Court now uses that term, to mean that the language and legal principles of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause now apply directly to the states as well as to the federal government.  See Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 122 (stating the question to be whether New York City’s landmark regulations “effect a ‘taking’ of
appellants’ property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of course is
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”).   Historically, the meaning of the
term “incorporation” has varied, and at times the term may have suggested a looser, analogical
relationship between the specific requirements of the first eight amendments applicable to the federal
government and the elements of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process applicable to the states.  It is only
on that looser analogical understanding that Chicago B & Q could be said to have “incorporated” a just
compensation principle similar to that found in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause into the concept of
Due Process in the Fourteenth Amendment.  But that is a very different from saying that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause itself now “applies to” the states, the position the Supreme Court now holds
and the position the Court erroneously attributes to Chicago B & Q.
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52See, e.g., 
53Cf. FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 240 (1973) (“The
idea that a regulation of the use of land which prevents the owner from making money can amount to a
taking assumes that a landowner has a constitutional right to use and develop his land for some purpose
which will result in a personal profit, regardless of the effect that such development will have on the
public”).  As a practical matter, this means the claimant often begins with an extraordinary benefit of the
doubt, as the Court assumes as a baseline, and without reference to state law, the maximum property
entitlement the claimant alleges, and then works backward to calculate whether a “taking” has occurred
by measuring the severity of “diminution” from that (possibly inflated) status quo ante expectation. 
Under the Penn Central balancing test, which treats “distinct investment-backed expectations” as a
separate element in the takings analysis, the property claimant is apparently entitled to an additional
bonus in the takings equation if she invested in detrimental reliance on her own (possibly inflated)
expectations.  This, of course, raises the disturbing possibility of self-entrenching property entitlements,
in which private parties can expand their constitutionally protected property rights by making speculative
investments.
54See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATC Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425 (1982)
(conceding that a state regulation requiring landlords to allow cable television wires on their property is a
valid police power regulation, but stating that it is “a separate question . . . whether an otherwise valid
regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid”); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29
(stating that Loretto stands for the proposition that a permanent physical occupation of land is
compensable “no matter how weighty the asserted ‘public interests’” and “similar treatment must be
accorded confiscatory regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all economically viable use of land”);
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (“It is, of course, well established that a
State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as
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the restrictions to not amount to a taking”).  While not specifically addressing the issue, the Penn Central
decision effectively acknowledged that New York City’s landmarks law served valid police power
purposes, but treated that conclusion as not dispositive of the takings issue. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
129 (acknowledging that state and municipal land use regulations that “enhance the quality of life by
preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city” embrace an “entirely permissible
governmental goal,” then proceeding to analyze appellant’s claims that the New York City law
nonetheless effects a compensable taking).   See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621, 647-50 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing and discussing Supreme Court cases
holding that a police power regulation may effect a Fifth Amendment taking, and stating that this
principle “has its source” in Mahon which “rejected the proposition that police power restrictions could
never be recognized as a Fifth Amendment ‘taking’”). 
55See Michelman, Property and Federalism, supra note   , at 327 (warning that contemporary
regulatory takings jurisprudence threatens to make “the Federal Constitution, specifically the Takings
Clause, dictate to the States the jurisprudential spirit in which their general laws of property and nuisance
are to be read and construed, whether contained in legislative enactments or judicial decisions”).
56See id. at 303 (describing the “bad fit” between the “market conservative” project of
contemporary regulatory takings doctrine and the “legal conservative” project of federalism in which
property rights are understood to be principally determined by state law)
57Cf. Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 1, at 695 (“To arrive at a coherent and consistent doctrine
of ‘takings,’ the Court must begin by addressing squarely the relationship between the Due Process and
Takings Clauses, and then must reconcile the two clauses by respecting their distinctive language and
constitutional function”).  Echeverria and Dennis argue that the current confusion in Takings doctrine is
the result of the Court’s having errantly slipped elements of Substantive Due Process analysis into
Takings law.  See id. at 698 (“as takings doctrine has evolved further, and particularly in the last ten
years, the distinctive character of the due process and takings inquiries has become obscured”; id. at 699
(incorporation of “analysis of the fit between regulatory ends and regulatory means in takings cases . . . is
the starkest example of importing due process thinking into the takings issue”).  Unlike this Article,
however, Echeverria and Dennis do not attribute this confusion to the backhanded conflation of the two
doctrines that occurred in Penn Central.  Instead, they assume that incorporation of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause against the states occurred much earlier, in such a way that states were constrained by the
both the Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process independently, with each inquiry proceeding under
a distinctive mode of analysis.  See id. at 697 (stating that Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon was decided
“under the Takings Clause” which employed “an alternative mode of analysis” to that used in
Substantive Due Process inquiries); id. at 698 (stating that Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead addressed
both Due Process and Takings Clause questions, and resolved each “on a different set of standards”).    In
contrast, this Article argues that both Mahon and Goldblatt were simply pre-incorporation Substantive
16
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Due Process cases implicating the “just compensation” element in Substantive Due Process analysis.  See
infra notes   and accompanying text (discussing Mahon); infra notes   and accompanying text (discussing
Goldblatt).          
58See supra note   . 
59Cf. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 122 (stating the question as whether New York City’s regulatory 
restrictions “effect a ‘taking’ of appellants’ property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment”); Rose, supra note 1, at 563 (characterizing takings law as an effort by courts to plumb the
“elusive[] . . . meaning of ‘taking’ in our law”).
60Cf.  Dolan; Palazzolo
61Cf. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937) (“What was the use of my
having come from Oakland it was not natural to have come from there yes write about it if I like or
anything if I like but not there, there is no there there.”)
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62For example, Ernst Freund’s influential 1904 treatise stated that the police power must be
understood “not as a fixed quantity, but as the expression of social, economic and political conditions.  
As long as those conditions vary, the police power must continue to be elastic, i.e., capable of
development.”  ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 3 (1904).  
Justice Holmes expressed a similar view in Block v. Hirsh:
“The fact that tangible property is also visible tends to give rigidity to our conception of our
rights in it that we do not attach to others less concretely clothed. But the notion that the former
are exempt from the legislative modification required from time to time in civilized life is
contradicted not only by the doctrine of eminent domain, under which what is taken is paid for,
but by that of the police power in its proper sense, under which property rights may be cut down,
and to that extent taken, without pay.”
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
63Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  Erie held that a tort case heard in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction should be decided under state law and not general federal common law.  As
the Erie Court famously declared: “Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.  There is no federal general common
law.” Id. at 78-80.  Some commentators have argued that the Erie rule applies only in diversity cases, but
the prevailing view in the academy and the courts is that the Erie doctrine is founded in constitutional
principles.  See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE
L.J. 929, 996-99 & nn. 335 & 336 (1995) (summarizing the debate and concluding that “the prevailing
view” is that Erie “does indeed rest on a constitutional base”).
64See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 993-
94 & n. 224 (2000) (tracing the roots of the longstanding “understanding that property is a positive right
largely (if not exclusively) defined by state law”).  But cf. Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings, supra note , at   
 (“In determining ownership rights, consideration should be given to all valid laws that affect an owner’s
rights in the thing owned” and a “sound inquiry . . . is not confined to common law, nor to state law
generally, but includes all laws, in all forms, from all levels of government”). Some property rights are
18
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created by federal law.  For example, certain intellectual property rights are created by Congress pursuant
to federal patent and copyright laws.  And certain other entitlements, such as social security disability
benefits, have been recognized to rise to the level of constitutionally protected property interests.  See
generally Merrill, supra , at   .
65Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (holding that § 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, providing that state laws “shall be recognized as rules of decision” in federal courts, is not
applicable in the context of commercial law or other “questions of a more general nature”).
66See Merrill, supra note   , at n. 224 and cases cited therein. See also Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160
U.S. 452 (1906) (holding that construction of a public levee on private waterfront land did not deprive
owner of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause because under
Louisiana law, all land fronting on navigable waterways is subject to a servitude or easement for
maintenance of levees, roads, or other public works).
67Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1907) (rejecting plaintiff’s 14th Amendment
Due Process claim of uncompensated “taking” because “under the law of New York, as determined by its
highest court, the plaintiff never owned the easements which he claimed, and . . . therefore there was no
property taken”)  
68See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19.
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69Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927)
70See Michelman, Property and Federalism, supra note   , at 305 (“By an argument that reaches
back at least to Bentham, property’s scope and content—property’s existence, even—are completely
dependent upon standing law,” consequently “the term ‘property’ in the Fourteenth Amendment denotes
nothing except what some corpus of extant positive law happens to make into property”); Eric T.
Freyfogle, Private Land Made (Too) Simple, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10155 (2003) (hereinafter Freyfogle,
Private Land) (stating that “natural rights justifications” for property law “were wisely cast aside . . . and
do not withstand scrutiny today”); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111 (C.K.
Ogden ed., 1931) (“[T]here is no such thing as natural property; . . . it is entirely the work of law”); id. at
113 (“Property and law are born together, and die together.  Before laws were made there was no
property; take away laws, and property ceases”).  For a contrary view, see Eric R. Claeys, Takings,
Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2003) (arguing for revival of a 19th
Century conception of property rights derived from universal principles of natural right which find their
expression in constitutional norms and general common law). 
71See Joseph L. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 490 (1988) (“The realists
argued that the concept of property . . . embraced competing values and principles” and courts “therefore
could not deduce specific principles from the abstract concept of property”); Margaret Jane Radin & R.
Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1295, 1295 (1998) (“The legal realists of the 1920s and ‘30s demonstrated that all law is
‘public’—that is, dependent upon the state”).
72See, e.g., Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory
Takings, and Judicial Process, 2001 UTAH L.REV. 379, 402-04 (2001) (describing property law as the
product of dynamic interplay between state court common law decisions and state legislative enactments
with no sharp line of demarcation, as common law developments are legislatively codified and long-
established legislative enactments are incorporated into the common law background). 
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73See Walston, supra note   , at 404 (describing how California adopted English common law
wholesale by legislative enactment in 1850 and subsequently modified common law water rights through
judicial decisions and legislative enactments that created the prior appropriation doctrine); Merrill, supra
note , at    ; Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (1993) (“Historically, property definitions have
continuously adjusted to reflect new economic and social structures, often to the disadvantage of existing
owners”); id. at 1448-49 (citing major adjustments in property law including abolition of feudal tenures,
primogeniture, and entails; termination of imprisonment for debt; modifications to dower and curtesy;
abolition of riparian water rights in the arid West; abolition of husbands’ rights in their wives’ estates;
and modifications to the law of trespass in company towns and shopping centers).
74See Merrill, supra note , at 945 (stating that “[p]roperty is a dynamic institution that
evolves over time in response to changing technologies and changing levels of supply and
demand,” and citing property innovations that adapted to changing social and economic needs
such as abolition of the fee tail and the rise of equitable servitudes, community property,
condominiums, securitized debt, and certain intellectual property rights).
75See, e.g., Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S.452  (1896) (holding that construction of a
public levee on private waterfront land did not deprive the landowner of property because under
Louisiana law traceable to the Code Napoleon, the public holds a servitude or easement over
lands abutting navigable waterways for purposes of maintaining levees, roads, and other public
works); In re Brown, 189 B.R. 653 (Bkrtcy., M.D. La. 1995) (interpreting a unique provision of
Louisiana law exempting “arms and military accoutrements” from “seizure under any writ,
mandate or process whatsoever,” and tracing this exemption to the Code Napoleon and earlier
French and Spanish property law).
76See Joseph A. Ranney, Anglicans, Merchants and Feminists: A Comparative Study of
the Evolution of Married Women’s Rights in Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin, 6 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 493, 503 (2000) (stating that early New York property law retained
elements of Dutch law, including “important strains of a community property system,” but these
were eventually replaced with English property law).
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77See, e.g., Ranney, supra note   , at 506-12  (tracing the dramatic expansion of married
women’s property rights in New York and the corresponding diminution of the rights of
husbands over spousal property under a series of court decisions, legislative enactments, and
state constitutional provisions adopted in the 19th century).
78See Ranney, supra, at 516-25 (describing divergent paths of New York and Virginia in
recognition of married women’s property rights).
79U.S. Const., Amdt. XIV, § 1 (“ . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law”).
80U.S. Const., Amdt V (" . . .nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation”). 
81Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  See also PruneYard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (“Nor as a general proposition is the United States, as opposed
to the several States, possessed of residual authority that enables it to define ‘property’ in the first
instance”); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378
(“Under our federal system, property ownership is not governed by a general federal law, but
rather by the laws of the several States”); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155
(1944) (“The great body of law in this country which controls the acquisition, transmission, and
transfer of property, and defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to private
parties, is found in the statutes and decisions of the state”); United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S.
266, 279 (1943) (“Though the meaning of 'property' as used in . . .  the Fifth Amendment is a
federal question, it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law.”); United States v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002) ("The federal tax lien statute itself ‘creates no property rights but
merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law.’”) (quoting
United States v. Bess, 371 U.S. 51, 55 (1958)).
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82See, e.g., American Mfrs. Mutual Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1999) (rejecting
procedural due process claim on grounds that plaintiff had not acquired a property interest under
Pennsylvania law); Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (“Because the
Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is
determined by reference to . . . state law”); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. at 601 (“mutually
explicit understandings” may create property interests but such understandings must support “a
legitimate claim of entitlement” under state law); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 538 (1985) (“Respondents’ federal constitutional claim depends upon their having had a
property right in continued employment” under state law, and “[i]f they did, the State could not
deprive them of this property without due process”).
83See Michelman, Property and Federalism, supra note , at 303 (describing the “bad fit”
between the “market conservative” project of contemporary regulatory takings doctrine and the
“legal conservative” project of federalism in which property rights are understood to be
principally determined by state law); id. at 327 (warning that contemporary regulatory takings
jurisprudence threatens to “federalize the law of land use in a particularly profound way,” making
“the Federal Constitution, specifically the Takings Clause, dictate to the States the jurisprudential
spirit in which their general laws of property and nuisance are to be read and construed, whether
contained in legislative enactments or judicial decisions”).      
84But cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that
Monsanto’s interest in health, safety, and environmental data is protected by the Takings Clause
to the extent such information is recognized as a “trade secret property right” under Missouri
law); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1960) (holding that a materialman’s lien
recognized as a property right under Maine law is protected against federal abrogation by the
Takings Clause).
85See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987)
(acknowledging that under Pennsylvania law the “support estate” is considered a separate interest
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in land, but stating that “our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic
distinctions”); id. at 518-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (chiding the Court for failing to properly
credit state property law as the basis for determining the extent and nature of claimants’ property
rights).    At issue in Keystone Bituminous was a Pennsylvania statute requiring that 50% of the
underground coal be kept in place to provide surface support to dwellings, public buildings, and
cemeteries.  Justice Holmes’ now-famous decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon held a similar
statute constitutionally impermissible, based in part upon Pennsylvania law’s recognition of the
support estate as a distinct estate in land severable from both the surface right and the subsurface
mineral right.  See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,  260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (stating that by
requiring subjacent support, the statute “purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania
as an estate in land—a very valuable estate”). 
86Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-27 (2001) (holding that a takings claim is
not barred by post-enactment acquisition on notice that the acquired property was subject to the
challenged regulation).    However, a majority of the Palazzolo Court was unwilling to go so far
as to hold that notice is flatly irrelevant to the takings claim, as Justice Scalia suggested in his
concurrence.  Compare Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view, the fact
that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title . . . should have no bearing upon the
determination whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking”), with id. at 633 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting Scalia’s position, stating that “[t]oday’s holding does not
mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial
to the Penn Central analysis”).
87Cf. Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings, supra note , at   (“A court in a takings case faces
two, sequential questions.  First, what are the plaintiff’s property rights, under the various valid
laws . . . [and second] has that property been taken?”). 
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88Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29.
89See 505 U.S. at 1029 (stating that a law denying the owner all economically viable use
of land “must . . . do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts—by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the
public generally, or otherwise”); id. at n.16 (“The principal ‘otherwise’ that we have in mind is
litigation absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of real and
personal property . . . to prevent . . . fire or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and
property of others”).  
90See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.REV. 873, 904-04 (1987) (“The
common law is not prepolitical”and “[e]fforts to change the common law background are not by
virtue of the fact constitutionally suspect”); Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverabil;ity,
and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227 (2004) (“it is beyond question that constitutional
requirements trump any contrary statutory enactments and that valid statutory enactments, in
turn, trump judicially crafted common law”)’ Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of
Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2107 (2002)  (stating that the “accepted
hierarchy of federal law” is that “the Constitution always trumps statutes, but statutes always
trump the common law”).
91See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 288 (1990)
(citing 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, § 51.02 &
n. 7 (N. Singer rev. 4th ed. 1984).
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92See Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings, supra note , at   & n. 9 (disputing the contention that
common law rules are the sole relevant source of property law for purposes of regulatory takings
analysis, and stating that it is the “rights crafted by the interactions” of “all laws, in all forms,
from all levels of government” that determines “what the law generally, and hence the
Constitution, deems property”); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property,
Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 281 (1996) (“For
almost a century now, legislators—with judicial acquiescence—have taken over the task of
refining and specifying the range of acceptable landowner practices, once defined only by
judicially administered trespass and nuisance law on a case-by-case basis”).  
93See Lucas, 505 U.S. at
94This is essentially the dispute between Justices O’Connor and Scalia in Palazzolo.  See
supra note    .   On Scalia’s interpretation of the majority’s holding, it would appear that each
successive owner of property would inherit all regulatory takings claims that might have been
made by her predecessor, in a potentially infinite chain.  On that theory, it is difficult to see how
a legislative enactment could ever pass into “background principle.”
95See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31 (citing Restatement (2nd) of Torts for appropriate
common law nuisance principles, but concluding that the “question . . . . is one of state law to be
dealt with on remand”).  See also Michelman, Property and Federalism, supra note , at 309
(stating that Justice Scalia writes parts of his opinion in Lucas “as if there is just one American
background law of property and nuisance—supportive, as it happens, of Lucas’ claim—that is
common to the national jurisdiction and all the state jurisdictions”).       
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96See James Burling, The Latest Take on Background Principles and the States’ Law of
Property After Lucas and Palazzolo, 24 U. HAW. L.REV. 497, 499 (2002) (“the notion that a
government can avoid the reach of the Takings and Just Compensation clauses by merely
invoking a harm-preventing police power rationale were [sic] put to rest in Lucas”).
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97See supra note 4 for a list of representative state high court cases asserting the police
power as a background inherent limitation on property rights.
98Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating statutory limitation on length of
work day for bakery workers as impermissible deprivation of liberty of contract under 14th
Amendment Due Process clause).  In the post-New Deal era, the Lochner case became
emblematic of judicial second-guessing of legislative policy determinations, hostility to
regulatory enactments, and bias in favor of private ordering under common law precepts in
constitutional adjudication.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.REV. 873,
873-74 (1987) 
99Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851)
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 a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil society,
that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this commonwealth
. . . is . . . held subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to the common
good and general welfare.”##
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100See supra note   and accompanying text.
101
 Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884).
102
 113 U.S. at 31. 
103See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (“Nor can legislation of that character [i.e..,
police power regulation] come within the fourteenth amendment, in any case, unless it is
apparent that its real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being,
but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without
due process of law.”)
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“[N]either the [Fourteenth] amendment—broad and comprehensive as it is—nor any other
amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its
police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state,
develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.”102
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104123 U.S. at 669.
105See Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 78 (1915) (“And it is well
settled that the enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a legitimate regulation established
under the police power is not a taking of property without compensation, or without due process
of law, in the sense of the 14th Amendment”).
106See, e.g., Martin v. District of Columbia, U.S. (1907) (“Under the police power, in its
strict sense, a certain limit might be set to the height of buildings without compensation; but to
make that limit 5 feet would require compensation and a taking by eminent domain”); Belleville
v. St. Clair Co. Turnpike Co., 84 N.E. 1049, 1053 (Ill 1908) (stating that a restraint on the use of
property to prevent harm to others or to advance the general welfare is “a regulation and not a
taking, an exercise of the police power and not of eminent domain.  But the moment the
Legislature passes beyond mere regulation, and attempts to deprive an individual of his property,
or of some substantial interest therein, under the pretense of regulation, then the act becomes one
of eminent domain” and just compensation is due). 
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107The eminent domain power was subject to the additional requirement that the
compensable “taking” be for a “public use,” a qualification expressly applicable to the federal
government under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and independently held applicable to
the states as a requirement of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.  See Fallbrook Irrigation
Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (reaffirming that the Fifth Amendment “public use”
clause applies only to the federal government, but holding that “the question whether private
property has been taken for any other than a public use becomes material in this court, even
where the taking is under the authority of the state, instead of the federal, government” as a
matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process).   Regulatory actions that fell outside the police
power and failed the “public use” test for eminent domain were simply declared void.  See, e.g.,
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (Missouri Pac. I) (invalidating regulatory
order directing railroad to make part of its right-of-way available to private parties to construct a
grain elevator, stating that the “taking by a state of the private property of one person or
corporation, without the owner’s consent, for the private use of another, is not due process of
law”).
108The federal government can create additional property rights beyond those recognized
by state law—for example, intellectual property rights such as patents and copyrights, or
guaranteed entitlements such as Social Security benefits.  See, e.g., 
109See supra notes and accompanying text.
110See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (striking down federal Violence
Against Women Act on Commerce Clause grounds, stating that “we can think of no better
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed
in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and the vindication of its victims”); U.S. v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 567 (1995) (overturning federal Gun-Free School Zones Act on
Commerce Clause grounds, stating that to uphold the government’s expansive commerce clause
claim “would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States”); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distillers & Warehouse
Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919) (“ That the United States lacks the police power, and that this was
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reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment, is true.”); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419
(1827) (the police power “unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the states”); 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1816) (“Th[e] [federal] government is acknowledged by
all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to
it ... is now universally admitted”).
111See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943) (“Though the
meaning of ‘property’ as used in . . . the Fifth Amendment is a federal question, it will normally
obtain its content by reference to local law”); but cf. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distillers &
Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1919) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment imposes . . . no greater
limitation upon the national power than does the Fourteenth Amendment upon state power. If the
nature and conditions of a restriction upon the use or disposition of property is such that a state
could, under the police power, impose it consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment without
making compensation, then the United States may for a permitted purpose impose a like
restriction consistently with the Fifth Amendment without making compensation.”).  Hamilton
rejected a takings challenge to a federal law closing distilleries, enacted pursuant to Congress’s
war powers.  The Hamilton Court concluded that a federal regulatory measure that imposes a
burden on a property owner no greater than that which could be imposed by the state pursuant to
its police power should be deemed not to trigger the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation
requirement.  A plausible rationale for such a holding might be that it is only by examining the
fullest extent of the state’s police power that we can determine how far the plaintiff’s (state-
defined) property rights really extend.
112Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (holding that city’s
acquisition of an easement for a public street required just compensation as a matter of Due
Process, but consequential costs arising from safety measures required under police power are
not compensable).
113Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding Los Angeles ordinance
prohibiting brickmaking in designated zone as valid police power regulation and therefore not a
Due Process violation, even though it extinguished most of the value of an existing brickyard). 
32


	'	
	
*
 
'*		)
	E
3


(""" 	
+

*
	/'	'
/
	
/	*

 
+
 
	+(


6	




/
			
		/
	
'
	*
	","$
	",3345
*'""1

114Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding Virginia Cedar Rust Act, providing
for destruction of infected trees to prevent spread of disease, as a valid police power regulation
and therefore not a Due Process violation).
115Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (invalidating Kohler Act, which
required mine operators to leave in place pillars of coal providing subjacent support to surface
property in cases where surface and subsurface rights had been severed, on grounds that it served
“limited” public interest and could not be sustained as valid police power regulation).
116
 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590  (1962) (upholding as a valid police power
regulation and therefore not a Due Process violation a local ordinance banning mining of sand
and gravel below the water table, effectively shutting down Goldblatt’s gravel mining business). 
The Goldblatt case did introduce an important ambiguity, however.  Citing Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, the Goldblatt Court stated that “governmental action in the form of regulation [might] be
so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation.” 369 U.S. at
594.  Since the record had not demonstrated any loss of value in the parcel as the result of
termination of mining, however, the Court proceeded to consider whether the ordinance “is
otherwise a valid police power regulation.” 369 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).   Read in light of
contemporary regulatory takings doctrine as developed in Penn Central and subsequent cases,
this may sound like a bifurcation of the Substantive Due Process (police power) and Takings
inquiries, and it has been so read by some subsequent commentators.  See, e.g., Echeverria &
Dennis, supra note 1, at   (interpreting Goldblatt to address both Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process and Fifth Amendment Takings questions).  Understood in light of Mahon and other
Substantive Due Process cases that preceded it, however, the “taking” and “otherwise within the
police power” questions appear to be dual aspects of a single inquiry: whether the ordinance fell
outside the bounds of the police power and therefore violated Due Process, either because it
“went too far” in imposing burdens on a property claimant while producing insufficient public
benefit per Mahon, see infra notes   and accompanying text, or “otherwise,” for example, because
the measure was demonstrably unreasonable, cf. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 595.  Note also that the
Goldblatt case came to the U.S. Supreme Court on direct appeal from the New York Court of
Appeals which had based its decision exclusively on state and federal Due Process grounds.  See
Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 211 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (N.Y. 1961). 
117Penn Cent. R. Co. v. New York , 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding New York City’s
landmark designation of Grand Central Terminal and establishing a balancing test for
constitutional Takings claims, weighing the gravity of the state’s interest against harm to
regulated party and factoring in “distinct investment-backed expectations”).
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118See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 232  n.6 (2003)
(citing Chicago B & Q for the proposition that “the Just Compensation clause” of the Fifth
Amendment “applies to the States as well as the Federal Government”); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) (citing Chicago B & Q for the proposition that “[t]he Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment . . . [was] made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment”).  
119Penn Cent. R. Co. v. New York , 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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120See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause applies only to the federal government, not to the states).
121See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L.REV. 782, 837-39 (arguing that Madison favored a Takings
Clause in the Bill of Rights to protect property owners against seizures of land and chattels
including slaves); id. at 850-53 (arguing that Madison believed land and slaves were the forms of
property most vulnerable to majoritarian impulses at the federal level). 
122See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 79-80
(1998) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is best understood as a federalism
amendment aimed at safeguarding states and their property-holding citizens against federal
“impressment” of property for military use, a despised practice widely employed by British
colonial and military authorities); Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights:
A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76
CAL. L. REV. 267, 292-93 (1988) (arguing on Madisonian grounds that the Takings Clause was
aimed at restraining the propensity of a remote central government to aggrandize itself by
confiscating property); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1122-23 (1993) (tracing the
history of the Takings Clause to concerns about “appropriation of private property to supply the
army during the Revolutionary War”).  See also Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 249-50
(opining that if at the time of ratification the people had “required additional safe-guards to
liberty from the apprehended encroachments of their particular [state] governments . . . the
remedy was in their own hands,” but instead they directed the Bill of Rights “against the
apprehended encroachments of the general government—not against those of the local
governments”).
35

	

	)
	

	(
-
	
''	)
	

>
		

	>/	
+'	("8? .'/	

/	'
	
	
/



'

+	
*
	
	
	*
6
+/		'"8"




/
	

		
		


'	
;
	/("88 	


	

+	
	


	'/	
		


**7
	

+	/




*	
+
		


6/'
	
	
123See Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1223-
24 (2002) (describing origins of the Takings Clause and the Bill of Rights generally as a response
to “anxieties of anti-federalists” in “the shadow of a Revolutionary War waged by local
governments against an imperial center”).  
124See AMAR, supra, at 79.  Such abuses were not solely the province of the British
Crown.   Pursuant to a resolution by the Continental Congress, the Pennsylvania Board of War 
in 1777 seized provisions from Pennsylvania citizens, including one Sparhawk, to prevent them
from falling into enemy hands.  The British managed to capture the goods anyway, and after the
war Sparhawk unsuccessfully sued the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for compensation.  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because Pennsylvania had not
waived sovereign immunity.  The Court went on to say, however, that even if it had jurisdiction
Sparhawk would lose on the merits because the loss was merely a “natural and necessary
incident” to “the powers of war” and therefore not compensable as it would be in peacetime.  
See Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788). 
125
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S.
Const., Amdt. I..
126The full text reads: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”  U.S. Const., Amdt. V.   On its face, then, the Fifth Amendment
is silent as to whether it protect persons against federal authority, state authority, or both. 
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127Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (dismissing Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause claim against municipal officials for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
128Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250-51 (holding that “the provision in the fifth amendment
to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use, without just
compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of
the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states”).
129See, e.g., Ex Parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131, 166 (1887) (citing Barron to support the
proposition that “the first 10 articles of amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the
state governments in respect to their own people, but to operate on the national government
alone”).
130See Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250 (“These amendments [the Bill of Rights] demanded
security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government—not against those of
the local governments” and “[h]ad the framers of these amendments intended them to be
limitations on the powers of the state governments, they would have imitated the framers of the
original constitution, and have expressed that intention”).
131Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250-51.  
132Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (holding that a state law authorizing
construction of a mill dam that caused flooding on plaintiff’s land, effected a compensable taking
under the Wisconsin constitution)..  The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, three years
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before Pumpelly.
13380 U.S. at 176-77 (“though the Constitution of the United States provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, it is well settled that this is
a limitation on the power of the Federal government, and not on the States”).
13480 U.S. at 179-80 (“As it is the constitution of that State that we are called on to
construe, these decisions of her Supreme Court, that overflowing land by means of a dam across
a stream is taking private property, within the meaning of that instrument, are of special weight if
not conclusive on us”).
135Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 101 (1888) (construing
railroad’s claim that an Alabama statute requiring it to test its employees for color-blindness
effected an unconstitutional deprivation of its property to rest on the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than the Fifth, because “the latter only applies a limit to federal authority, not restricting
the power of the state”).
136Winous Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen, 193 U.S. 189, 191 (1904).
137Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 34 (1918).
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138See, e.g., Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899) (citing Barron  for the proposition
that “[t]he first ten Amendments to the Federal Constitution contain no restrictions on the powers
of the states, but were intended to operate solely on the Federal government”); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 93 (1908) (same); Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211,
217 (1916) (citing Barron for the proposition that “the first ten amendments . . . are not
concerned with state action, and concern only federal action”); Gasquest v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S.
367, 369 (1917) (citing Barron for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment “is not restrictive of
state, but only of national, action”); U.S. v. Lanza, 269 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (citing Barron for
the proposition that “the fifth Amendment, like all the other guaranties in the first eight
amendments, applies only to proceedings by the federal government”); Feldman v. United States,
322 U.S. 487 (1944) (“for more than one hundred years, ever since Barron v. Baltimore . . .  one
of the settled principles of our Constitution has been that these [Bill of Rights] Amendments
protect only against invasion of civil liberties by the [federal] Government whose conduct they
alone limit”) (citation omitted); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 141 (1952) (citing Barron for
the proposition that “the Fifth Amendment may not itself prohibit states from using their power
to force self-incriminatory statements”);  Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 376 & fn.2 (1958)
(citing Barron to support the proposition that the provisions of Bill of Rights “are not restrictions
upon the vast domain of the criminal law that belongs exclusively to the states,” and quoting at
length from the Barron opinion).  
139
 See, e.g., Citizens Utility Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 322 N.E.2d 857, 860 fn. 4
(Ill. App. 1974) (5th Amendment Takings Clause “is a limitation only on the powers of the
federal government”); Farmington River Co. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm’n 197 A.2d 653,
658  (Conn. Super. 1963) (Fifth Amendment Takings Clause “does not restrain a state in the
exercise of its authority”); Williams v. State Highway Comm’n, 113 S.E.2d 263, 265 (N.C.
1960) (“is a limitation upon the federal government, and not upon the states”); Elkins-Swyers
Office Equip. Co. v. Moniteau County, 209 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Mo. 1948) (“applies only to the
Federal government and not to the states”); Demeter Land Co. v. Florida Public Service Co., 128
So. 402, 405-06 (Fla. 1930) (“was not intended to limit the powers of states, but to operate on the
national government alone”); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (Mass. 1927)
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
(The issue did periodically arise in the state courts, however, which
until the 1970s continued to adhere to the view that Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal
government."1#
(“does not govern the actions of the several states, but only of the federal government” and “has
no bearing on the case at bar”); Smith v. Cameron, 210 P. 716, 718 (Or. 1922) ( “is a restriction
upon Congress, and not upon state Legislatures,” and interpretation of parallel state constitutional
provision is purely “a local affair”); Banner Milling Co. v. State, 191 N.Y.S. 143, 150 (N.Y. Ct.
Cl. 1921) (“has no application” to a takings claim against the state “because it is elementary that
the first ten amendments to that instrument are applicable only to the federal government, are
restrictions upon its action, and are not limitations upon the powers of the states”); Los Angeles
v. Allen, 163 P. 697, 700 (Cal. 1917) (“need not be considered, since that amendment is one of
those which are restrictive of the power of the federal government, and not restraints upon the
states”); Wright v. House, 121 N.E. 433, 435 (Ind. 1919) (“applies only to the federal
government” and “does not apply to the government of the several states, and . . .  a state statute
cannot be held invalid because it may conflict with the provisions of this amendment”); Riley v.
Charleston Union Station Co., 51 S.E. 485, 487 (S.C. 1905) (“has no application to the case at
bar, the provisions of that amendment having been and being intended as limitations upon the
powers of Congress, and as restraints upon the government of the United States, and not upon a
state government”).
140See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.581, 606 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee, “privileges and immunities embrace at least
those expressly recognized by the Constitution of the United States and placed beyond the power
of Congress to take away or impair”).
141Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 614 (“When, therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the
deprivation by any state of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, the intention was
to prevent any state from infringing the guaranties for the protection of life and liberty that had
already been guarded against infringement by the national government”).   Notably, Harlan cited
Chicago B & Q to refute Hurtado-type arguments that express inclusion of specified rights
elsewhere in the Bill of Rights precluded their being considered part of Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process.  See id.    Harlan, in dissent, was thus the first explicitly to equate the just
compensation requirement found in Fourteenth Amendment Due Process with that of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, though of course his overall position was that selective
incorporation through Chicago B & Q would have been unnecessary because the Fourteenth
Amendment had effected a blanket incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights.
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(In the 1940s,  Justice Hugo Black took up the cry,
arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause had effectively repealed Barron and
142
 See, e.g, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “one of the chief objects” of the Fourteenth Amendment was to overturn Barron v.
Baltimore and  “make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states”).
143See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (First Amendment guarantees of free
speech and free press are part of “liberty” protected against state encroachment by Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 105, 120 (1943)
(Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause “now is held to have drawn the contents of the First
Amendment into the category of individual rights protected from state deprivation”).
144Penn Cent. R. Co. v. New York , 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
145438 U.S. at 122 (emphasis added).
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incorporated the entire Bill of Rights against the states.142 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‘taking’ of appellants' property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
which of course is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”":<
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146Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) 
147See, e.g., 
148See, e.g., 
149See, e.g., 
150See, e.g., 
151See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Chicago B & Q opinion “contains no mention of either the Takings Clause or the Fifth
Amendment”).  
152See Chicago B & Q, 166 U.S. at 235 (stating the question before the Court to be
“whether the due process of law enjoined by the fourteenth amendment requires compensation to
be made or adequately secured to the owner of property taken for public use under authority of a
state”).
153See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state regulation of bakers’
working hours as unwarranted state interference with liberty of contract protected by Fourteenth
amendment Due Process guarantee).  See also Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note     , at 873
(describing Lochner as “the most important of all defining cases” over a half century of
constitutional jurisprudence).
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154166 U.S. at 230.
155See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. V. City of Chicago, 37 N.E. 78 (Ill. 1894).
156166 U.S. at 234.
157166 U.S. at 236.
158166 U.S. at 255-56.  The Chicago B & Q Court confined itself to examining whether
the jury instructions were erroneous as a matter of law and did not expressly affirm the jury’s
award of one dollar in compensation, stating that it was beyond its power to re-examine jury
determinations of fact.  See id. at 245-46.  By holding that the jury award was not based on faulty
instructions, however, the Court backhandedly endorsed the result reached below.
159See 166 U.S. at 237-38 (citing state cases holding that due process requires just
compensation, and dicta in previous Supreme Court cases citing that doctrine with approval).
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“[i]n determining what is due process of law, regard must be had to substance, not to form.”156  In
an eminent domain case, the Court concluded,  “[d]ue process of law as applied to judicial
proceedings instituted for the taking of private property for public use means such process as
recognizes the right of the owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from him and
transferred to the public.”157  The Court went on to affirm the Illinois Supreme Court’s judgment,
however, holding that because all the city had obtained was the right to construct a street across
the railroad’s land, the trial court had not erred in instructing the jury that the measure of
compensation should be the difference between the value of the right-of-way not so encumbered,
and the value of the same right-of-way subject to a street crossing.158
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160In the previous term, a case brought by the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad against
the City of Chicago on facts almost identical to those of Chicago B & Q came before the Court,
but was dismissed on grounds that the railroad had failed to preserve the constitutional issue in
its state court pleadings.  See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 164 U.S. 454 (1896). 
161Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 116, 145-46 (1876) (emphasis added). 
162Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1877) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
163Stone v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1876)
164Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) (under the states’ power of eminent
domain, “property may not be taken for public use without just compensation”)
44
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“The power of the State over the property of the citizen under the [Fourteenth
 Amendment Due Process] constitutional guaranty is well defined. The State may take his
property for public uses, upon just compensation being made therefor. It may take a
portion of his property by way of taxation for the support of the government. It may
control the use and possession of his property, so far as may be necessary for the
protection of the rights of others, and to secure to them the equal use and enjoyment of
their property.”161
The “just compensation” language in Munn was only dicta, however, and consequently
had limited precedential value.  In the 1877 case Davidson v. City of New Orleans, Justice
Bradley’s concurrence forcefully expressed the view that “[i]f a State, by its laws, should
authorize private property to be taken for public use without compensation . . . I think it would be
depriving a man of his property, without due process of law.”162  As a concurrence, of course, this
statement, too, carried little precedential weight.  Similarly, the 1886 majority opinion in Stone v.
Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co. stating that the state’s power to regulate railroad rates under the
police power “is not a power to destroy” and does not extend to “that which in law amounts to a
taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due process of
law,”163 could not be considered a constitutional holding of binding precedential effect.  
 The next year in the hugely influential case Mugler v. Kansas, the Court again opined that
when states exercised their power of eminent domain, it necessitated payment of just
compensation, although the Court did not expressly ground this requirement in the Due Process
guarantee.164  Three years later, in Searl v. School Dist. No. 2 of Lake County, the Court yet again
165
 Searl v. School Dist. No .2 of Lake County, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890)
166Sweet v. Rechel 159 U.S. 380, 398-99 (1895) 
16794  U.S. at 145-46.
168123 U.S. at 668. 
169166 U.S. at 251-52.  As the court put it, “it is not a condition of the exercise of that [police
power] authority that the state shall indemnify the owners of property for the damage or injury resulting
from its exercise. . . .   The requirement that compensation be made for private property taken for public
use imposes no restriction upon the inherent power of the state by reasonable regulations to protect the
45
stated that as a matter of universal law, the eminent domain power “cannot be exercised except
upon condition that just compensation shall be made to the owner,”165 but once again did not
expressly hold that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process so required.  The Court reiterated this
principle once more in 1895 in Sweet v. Rechel, 
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( 166  Once again, however, there was no express Fourteenth
Amendment holding on the just compensation question.
Despite their limited value as precedent, these cases make it abundantly clear that long
before Chicago B & Q was decided—indeed, throughout the entire course of its Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence—the Supreme Court had understood the core requirements of Due
Process to include the principle that any exercise of the eminent domain power required payment
of just compensation.  The significance of the Chicago B & Q holding was that it securely
anchored this well-established conception of the Due Process guarantee in binding legal
precedent.  That was its only significance.
The Chicago B & Q case also required the Court to decide a second issue, however.  That
issue implicated another, equally important strand in the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process jurisprudence.  The railroad argued that in addition to receiving full compensation for the
value of the right-of-way taken by eminent domain, it should also be compensated for the cost of
constructing gates, an operating tower, planking and fill, as well as the additional operating costs
associated with a grade crossing necessitated by the city’s construction of the street across its rail
line.  The Court roundly rejected this claim.  Munn167, Mugler168 and other seminal Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process cases had clearly established that while just compensation would be
required in any exercise of the eminent domain power, compensation would never be required for
losses sustained in consequence of a valid exercise of the state’s police power.169  Applying that
lives and secure the safety of the people.”  Id.
170166 U.S. at 251-52.
171166 U.S. at 251-52.
172See Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398-99 (1895) (stating that the state may enact
police power regulations without paying compensation, but when “the legislature provides for the
actual taking and appropriation of private property for public uses, authority to enact such a
regulation rests upon its right of eminent domain” and “it is a condition precedent to the exercise
of such power that the statute make provision for reasonable compensation to the owner”).
173See, e.g., West Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. People, 201 U.S. 506, 526 (1906) (citing
Chicago B & Q in support of holding that costs to the railroad of removing structures that
obstruct navigation “cannot be deemed a taking of private property for public use” but are “only
the result of the lawful exercise of a governmental power for the common good”); Florida East
Coast Ry. Co. v. Martin County, 171 So.2d 873, 877 (Fla. 1965) (citing Chicago B & Q in
support of holding that costs incurred by railroad in constructing safety measures at a grade
46
distinction to the case at hand, the Chicago B & Q Court flatly rejected the railroad’s claim for
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crossing are “the result of the exercise of the police powers of the state” and not compensable);
Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines v. Board of Public Unity Comm’rs, 81 A.2d 28, 31 (N.J.
App. Div.1951) (same); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 41 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931) (same).
174166 U.S. at 235
175See 166 U.S. at 235-41.  
176See 166 U.S. at 235-36 (citing Davidson v. New Orleans and Missouri Pac. R. Co, v.
Nebraska).   In Davidson, the Court had held that “a statute which declares in terms, and without
more, that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land, which is now in A., shall be
and is hereby vested in B., would, if effectual, deprive A. of his property without due process of
law, within the meaning of the constitutional provision.”  Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97,
102 (1877). See also Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (“The taking
by a state of the private property of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for
the private use of another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the fourteenth article of
amendment of the constitution of the United States.”)   Neither case made reference to the Fifth
Amendment Takings clause which by its terms prohibits the taking of private property except for
public use and upon payment of just compensation.
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177See 166 U.S. at 226-263 (nowhere mentioning Fifth Amendment)
178See supra notes   and accompanying text. 
179Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (Nov. 16 1896) (citation
omitted). Chicago B & Q was decided some three-and-a-half months later, on March 1, 1897,
without reference to Fallbrook’s reaffirmation of Barron.  
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had just recently reaffirmed the Barron  holding earlier in the same term, a mere three-and-a-half
months before issuing its Chicago B & Q opinion.  In Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, the
Court emphatically stated:
“There is no specific prohibition in the federal constitution which acts upon the
states in regard to their taking private property for any but a public use. The fifth
amendment, which provides, among other things, that such property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation, applies only to the federal
government, as has many times been decided. In the fourteenth amendment the
taking of private property is omitted, and the prohibition against the states is
confined to its depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”179
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180The Court stated that through operation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, “the question whether private property has been taken for any other than a public use
becomes material in this court, even where the taking is under the authority of the state, instead
of the federal, government.” Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 158.
181Stating that “what is a public use frequently and largely depends upon the facts and
circumstances surrounding the particular subject-matter in regard to which the character of the
use is questioned,” the Court opined that “the irrigation of lands in states where there is no color
of necessity therefor” might not count as a “public use,” but “in a state like California, which
confessedly embraces millions of acres of arid lands, an act of the legislature providing for their
irrigation might well be regarded as an act devoting the water to a public use, and therefore as a
valid exercise of the legislative power.” Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 159-60.
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182Indeed, in the decades that followed, courts more often cited Fallbrook for the
proposition that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause did not apply to states than Chicago B &
Q for the opposite proposition.  See, e.g., Luedtke v. Milwaukee County, 521 F.2d 387, 389 (7th
Cir. 1975) (citing Fallbrook for the proposition that 5th Amendment Takings Clause applies only
to the federal government and not to state); accord, Riley v. Atkinson, 413 F. Supp. 413, 415
(N.D. Miss. 1975); Luedtke v. Milwaukee Couty, 371 F.Supp. 1040, 1043 (E.D. Wi. 1974); City
of Boston v. Mass. Port Auth., 320 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (D. Mass. 1971); Elkins-Swyers Office
Equip. Co. v. Moniteau County, 209 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Mo. 1948); Demeter Land Co. v. Florida
Public Serv. Co., 128 So. 402, 405-06 (Fla. 1930); Wright v. House, 121 N.E. 433, 435 (Ind.
1919); Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 105 N.E. 496, 498 (Ind. 1914). 
183See Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899) (citing Barron  for the proposition that
“[t]he first ten Amendments to the Federal Constitution contain no restrictions on the powers
ofen the states”).
184See supra note and cases cited therein.
185Westlaw’s KeyCite service, for example, lists Barron as having “some negative history
but not overruled,” and cites only two lower court cases as “negative indirect history.”  One of
those, Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1066 n.17 (9th Cir. 2002), cites Barron in a footnote as
a “now-rejected” precedent for some cases it seeks to distinguish, without offering any support
for that characterization.   Similarly, U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221 n.13 (5th Cir. 2001),
questioned the applicability of precedents based on Barron in a footnote not germane to the
ultimate disposition of the case.
186Even Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in    did not make this assertion.  Harlan argued
that blanket incorproation of the entire Bill of Rights had been effected directly by adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause.
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187Winous Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen, 193 U.S. 189, 191 (1904) (dismissing Fifth
Amendment Just Compensation claim against the state of Ohio for lack of federal question
jurisdiction, stating that the Fifth Amendment “is a restriction on Federal power, and not on the
power of the states”)
188Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32 (1918) (dismissing for want of subject matter jurisdiction
plaintiff’s claim against the state of Ohio under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause).  The
Palmer court cited Barron in support of its conclusion that there was no cognizable federal
question in plaintiff’s “palpably groundless” Fifth Amendment claim against the state.  Id. at 34. 
In neither case did the Court cite Chicago B & Q.
189See, e.g., Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 799 F.2d 317, 326 (7th
Cir., 1986) (“The Takings Clause does not apply directly to the states, but the Supreme Court has
used the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment to supply a similar set of rules”);
Luedtke v. Milwaukee County, 521 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1975) (5th Amendment Takings
Clause “applies only to a taking by the federal government, and not to actions by state agencies
or private parties”); Luedtke v. Milwaukee County, 371 F.Supp. 1040, 1043 (E.D. Wisc.
1974)(“applies only to a taking by the federal government and not to actions by state agencies or
private airlines”); City of Boston v. Mass. Port Auth., 320 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (D. Mass.
1971)(same); Riley v. Atkinson, 413 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D. Miss. 1975) (“bears only upon the
exercise of powers of the United States Government, and affords no ground for relief against the
State or the County Board of Supervisors); Gulf & S.I. R. Co. v. Ducksworth, 286 F. 645, 647
(5th Cir. 1923) (“bears alone upon the exercise of power by the United States government and
affords no ground for relief against the state or its officers”).
190See supra note   and cases cited therein
191For example, Ernst Freund’s influential treatise on the police power, published in
1904—seven years after Chicago B & Q—flatly stated that “the first ten amendments apply only
to the federal government itself,” while “[t]he fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause
are at present chiefly relied upon as checks upon the police power of the states.”  FREUND, supra
note , at 65
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192See, e.g., Freund, supra note    , at 541-42 (stating that “the taking for public use
without compensation has never in any civilized country been regarded as a legitimate exercise
of state power, and the payment of compensation is therefore correctly held to be a requirement
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment,” and citing Chicago B & Q for the
constitutional holding that “[d]ue process of law as applied to judicial proceedings instituting the
taking of private property for public use means such process as recognizes the right of the owner
to be compensated if his property be wrested from him and transferred to the public”).
193See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (characterizing the “similar”). 
See infra note   and accompanying text.
194To adapt a famous example from Gottlob Frege, if we say, “The morning star is the
evening star,” we mean they share a single identity; both descriptors connote the same object, the
planet Venus.  If we say, “The morning start is identical to (or the same as) the evening star,” we
would imply that they were alike in all relevant respects.  But if we were to say, “The morning
star is similar to the evening star,” we would merely be noting that they share some common
characteristics, while at least leaving open the possibility that they are unalike in some other
respects.
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195Hairston v. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908) (noting the “propriety of
keeping in view by this court, while enforcing the 14th Amendment, the diversity of local
conditions, and of regarding with great respect the judgments of the state courts upon what
should be deemed public uses in that state” in “conformity with its laws”).
196Compare, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)  (Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process case, citing as precedent such previous Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process cases as Hadcheck v. Sebastian, Mahon, and Mugler) with United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946) (Fifth Amendment Takings Clause case, citing as precedent such previous Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause cases as U.S. v. Miller, U.S. v. Powelson, U.S. v. Cress, and U.S. v.
General Motors).  A singular exception is Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), in
which Justice Douglas, for the Court, relied on a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause case against
the federal government, U.S. v. Causby, to resolve a claim against a local government body that
had been brought under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.  Both Griggs and
Causby involved overflights of private property in the vicinity of airports, and the legal
question—whether authorization for such overflights effected a “taking” of the property of
nearby homeowners—appeared to be virtually indistinguishable. Compare Griggs, 369 U.S. at
531 (“The question is whether respondent has taken an air easement over petitioner's property for
which it must pay just compensation as required by the Fourteenth Amendment”), with Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946) (“The problem presented is whether respondents' property was taken
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within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and navy
aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes.”)   Justice Douglas authored both opinions. 
Douglas plainly frames the Griggs case as a Fourteenth Amendment question, but nonetheless
proceeds to treat the  Fifth Amendment holding in Causby as dispositive without addressing
either the incorporation issue (which the Court had not yet decided) or the propriety of such inter-
doctrinal borrowing in the absence of incorporation.   Unlike most Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process just compensation claims, however, Griggs did not turn on the legitimate scope of the
state’s police power.  At issue in Griggs was not a police power regulation, but whether the
regular physical invasion of a portion of the claimant’s property by aircraft amounted to the
“taking” of an easement.  With the police power not at issue, it may have been less problematic
for the Court to engage in inter-doctrinal borrowing to determine that an identical physical
invasion constituted a “taking” under either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment branch of
just compensation law.  
197See Wight v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371, 384 (1901).
198Norwood v. Baker,   U.S.
199See Wight, 181 U.S. at 
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200Wight, 181 U.S. at 387 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Note, however, that Harlan’s dissent 
argues that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clauses must be read as identical,
not that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is identical to the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process just compensation requirement.
201See, e.g., Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246, 250 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Lappin v. District of Columbia, 22 App. D.C. 68 (D.C. Cir. 1903);
202Chicago, B. & Q., 166 U.S. at 238.
203Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390-91 (1898).
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204Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-100.
205As the Court said in Hurtado v. California, where it rejected a claim that Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process includes a right to grand jury presentment or indictment in state
criminal cases: 
“According to a recognized canon of interpretation, especially applicable to formal and
solemn instruments of constitutional law, we are forbidden to assume, without clear
reason to the contrary, that any part of this most important amendment is superfluous.
The natural and obvious inference is that, in the sense of the constitution, 'due process of
law' was not meant or intended to include . . . the institution and procedure of a grand jury
in any case. The conclusion is equally irresistible, that when the same phrase [“Due
Process”] was employed in the fourteenth amendment to restrain the action of the states,
it was used in the same sense and with no greater extent; and that if in the adoption of that
amendment it had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in
all the states, it would have embodied, as did the fifth amendment, express declarations to
that effect.”
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884).  Hurtado has never been overruled.
206See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932).
207See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534 (“when the same phrase [“Due Process”] was employed
in the fourteenth amendment to restrain the action of the states, it was used in the same sense and
with no greater extent” than when it is used in the Fifth Amendment).
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208287 U.S. at 67 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926)).
209U.S. v Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 471 (1903) (quoting Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893)).  See also U.S. v. Williams, 188 U.S. 485 (1903) (same);
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 153 (1900) ("[I]n its exercise of the power to regulate
commerce Congress may not override the provision that just compensation must be made when
private property is taken for public use.”).
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without violating those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions.’”8?%
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210See Munn v. Illinois 94 U.S. 116, 145-46 (1876) (drawing distinction between taking
of property for public use and valid police power regulations).
211Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623.
212
213Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 683 (1888) (upholding Pennsylvania statute
prohibiting sale of oleomargarine as a valid police power regulation, and “the fourteenth
amendment was not designed to interfere with the exercise of that power by the states”).
214Reinman v. Little Rock, 239 U.S. 39 (1915) (upholding as valid police power
regulation a local ordinance prohibiting operation of livery stables within designated zone,
forcing closure of established business).
215Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). (upholding city ordinance prohibiting
brickmaking in designated zone as a valid exercise of police power, despite near-total destruction
of value of property used in brick manufacture).
216Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding as a valid police power regulation,
and therefore non-compensable, a state statute that provided for destruction of infected trees to
prevent spread of disease).
217Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding as a valid police power
regulation, and therefore non-compensable, a local ordinance prohibiting gravel mining even
though it resulted in near-total loss of value of plaintiff’s property). As the Goldblatt court
explained the traditional Substantive Due Process rule: “If this ordinance is otherwise a valid
exercise of the town’s police powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial
use does not render it unconstitutional.” 369 U.S. at 592..  The Goldblatt Court cited prior
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process cases like Hadacheck,  Mugler, Walls v. Midland Carbon,
and Reinman v. Little Rock.  Notably, it cited Mugler for the relevant distinction between a police
58
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power exercise and the eminent domain power, but acknowledged along with Mahon that a
regulation may “go too far” and become a “taking” in the Fourteenth Amendment sense, that is, it
may fall outside the police power and therefore be considered a backdoor exercise of eminent
domain.  See id. at     .
218Mugler, 123 U.S. at
219Atlantic Coast Line R. Co v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914).  See also Freund,
supra note , at 124 (“Under the Fourteenth Amendment the United States is competent to protect
individual liberty and property against arbitrary or unequal state legislation enacted under color
59
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of protection of safety and health, but having in reality no such justification . . . .”)
220See, e.g., Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (“For just as there comes a point at
which the police power ceases and leaves only that of eminent domain, it may be conceded that
regulations of the present sort pressed to a certain height might amount to a taking without due
process of law”); 
221Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196, 206 (1910) (hereinafter Missouri Pac.
II).  The case was in part a reprise of an earlier case, also styled Missouri Pac. R. Co. v.
Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (hereinafter Missouri Pac. I), in which the court struck down a
state regulatory commission order compelling the railroad to lease a portion of its right-of-way
on non-discriminatory terms to private parties for purposes of constructing a grain elevator.  The
Missouri Pac. I Court held the action violated due process because of the action was for private
benefit, not public use
222217 U.S. at 206.
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223Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1923)
224Nor was Mahon the first case to invalidate a legislative or regulatory enactment as an
impermissible deprivation or “taking” of property on Due Process grounds.  See, e.g., Missouri
Pac. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (Missouri Pac. I) (holding that a state order
authorizing an association of private citizens to build a grain elevator on the railroad’s right-of-
way was “a taking of private property of the railroad corporation, for the private use of the
petitioners” and therefore “not due process of law”); Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 393
(1904) (holding that a municipal ordinance imposing sudden, unexplained, and drastic changes in
rules governing a privately owned gas works so as to make it not commercially viable was an
“arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power which amounts to a taking of property
without due process of law”); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196, 206 (1910)
(Missouri Pac. II) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring railroad to construct a sidetrack at
its own expense to serve private grain elevators on land adjacent to the railroad’s right of way on
grounds that it exceeds the police power and “does not provide indemnity for what it requires”);
St. Louis, I.M. & So. R. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354 (1912) (holding unconstitutional a statute
requiring railroad to pay double liability and attorneys fees’ if it fails to promptly pay demand for
killing of livestock on grounds that it deprives the railroad of property without due process);
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance
authorizing two thirds of the property owners on a block to establish building setback
requirements applicable to the entire block on grounds that it is “an unreasonable exercise of the
police power” with no demonstrable connection to health, safety, morals, or general welfare,
placing standardless discretion in some private parties to arbitrarily restrict the property rights of
others); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914) (holding
unconstitutional a statute doubling railroad’s liability if it does not pay demand for compensation
within 60 days); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance
barring sales of property to persons of color on grounds that it deprived white owners of their
right to freely alienate property without a legitimate police power justification, and therefore
infringed 14th Amendment due process guarantee); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328, 329
(1921) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting courts to enjoin picketing by striking
employees on grounds that it “deprives the owner of the business and the premises of the
property without due process, and cannot be held valid under the Fourteenth Amendment”
because it operates as “a purely arbitrary or capricious exercise of [the police] power whereby a
wrongful and highly injurious invasion of property rights . . . is practically sanctioned”).
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225As of March 29, 2004, Westlaw’s KeyCite service listed 1103 judicial citations to
Mahon by all federal and state courts, the vast majority of them in the post- Penn Central era.  By
my count, Mahon was cited a total of 321 times over a period of almost six decades between its
issuance and the Penn Central decision, an average of fewer than six citations per year.  In the
post-Penn Central  period from mid 1978 through March, 2004, Mahon was cited 782 times, an
average of more than 30 citations per year.  Even assuming increased judicial caseloads and a
greater volume of reported cases over this period, the difference is striking.  
226Women’s Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1932)
(citing Mahon and six other cases, including two that pre-date Mahon, for the quoted
proposition).  See also, e.g., Western Intern. Hotels v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 387 F.
Supp. 429, 434 (D. Nev. 1975) (citing Mahon for the proposition that “police power regulation
had its limits,” but noting that this idea “antedates even Holmes”).  
227See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Commr. of Envtl. Protection, 362 A.2d 948, 951
(Conn. 1975).
228See, e.g., Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 (1935) (citing Mahon
and eight other cases for the proposition that the “police power is subject to the constitutional
limitation that it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably”) ; Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (citing Mahon and four other cases for the proposition that “[p]rohibitory
legislation has been held invalid, because unnecessary, where the denial of liberty involved was
that of engaging in a particular business”); Appeal of Key Realty Co., 182 A.2d 187, 191 (Pa.
1962 ( citing Mahon and 11 other cases for the proposition that police power regulations are
valid “whenever they are necessary for the preservation of public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare, and not unjustly discriminatory, or arbitrary, or unreasonable, or confiscatory in
their application to a particular or specific piece of property”).
62

'88<			/
/*
	

	
/	
A	B
/
*'	



2
'/	
		
	+
( 88= 4	
F
3	
	
	
/




	@+	
2+


*


	/
	
+		
	/' 
3+






	
/( 88$ 4	
		'

+




	

	
/'


(88% 5	+	


/	
	
/'
	/+'/

6
		
+
)	,-'
	


229For example, a 1927 Harvard Law review article lists Mahon as one of 28 “police
power cases” decided between 1896 and 1927 in which the Supreme Court invalidated
“substantive legislation of a social or economic character” on Due Process grounds.  See Ray A.
Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L.REV. 943, 944
& fnn. 7-10 (1927).  Holmes himself subsequently characterized Mahon as a 14th Amendment
police power case.  See Frost v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 601 (1926) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing Mahon and Edgar A Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, as
“extreme cases” on opposite sides of the “delicate” line separating legitimate exercises of the
police power from impermissible deprivations of private property rights).  This view also
prevailed in other courts.  See, e.g., Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, 9 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that in Mahon “the gravamen of the constitutional challenge
to the regulatory measure was that it was an invalid exercise of the police power under the due
process clause” and the case was “decided under that rubric”); Beal v. Reading Co., 87 A.2d 214,
218 (Pa. 1952) (stating that Mahon held the Kohler Act “unconstitutional, as an improper
exercise of the police power”); Hulen v. City of Corsicana, 65 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1933)
(citing Mahon and seven other cases for the proposition that because the limits of the police
power are “shadowy, vague, and apparently shifting, it is in the last analysis for the courts to say
whether questioned action has properly called into being the exercise of the [police] power, and
whether the power is being exercised reasonably and within the limits of public necessity”);
Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528, 532 ((9th Cir. 1931) (stating that
Mahon “held that [the Kohler Act] was so unreasonable an exercise of the police power that it
was violative of the constitutional rights guaranteed to the Pennsylvania Coal Company and
therefore void”); Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co. v. Oklahoma City, 14 F.Supp. 370, 377 (D. Okla.
1930) (stating that Mahon “held . . .  that the prohibition in the legislative act exceeded the police
power, whether viewed as a protection to private surface owners or to cities having surface
rights”).  The California Supreme Court aptly summed up the conventional, pre-Penn Central
view of Mahon as follows:
“That was an action between two private parties, the statute involved admittedly
destroyed previously existing rights of property and contract as reserved between the
parties, and the propriety of the statute's prohibition upon the single valuable use of the
property for coal-mining operations was considered in relation to special benefits to be
gained by an individual rather than by the whole community. In those circumstances
application of the statute to the property was held to effect such diminution in its value as
to be unconstitutional and beyond the legitimate scope of the police power.”
McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 264 P.2d 932, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 891 (1954). 
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230See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Mahon as “the leading case for the
proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so
frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a ‘taking’).  See generally
Brauneis, supra note   
231See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, U.S. 
535 U.S. 302, 325 (2002) (stating that Mahon “gave birth to our regulatory takings
jurisprudence”); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997) (citing
Mahon for the proposition that “a regulation that ‘goes too far’ results in a taking under the Fifth
Amendment”); Lucas, 260 U.S. at 1014 (stating that prior to Mahon, “it was generally thought
that the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property”); San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 649-49 (1981) (“the principle that a regulation
can effect a Fifth Amendment ‘taking’ . . . has its source in Justice Holmes’ opinion for the Court
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon”).  This Article argues that these claims are false on two
fronts: Mahon was not a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause case, nor was it the first Fourteenth
Amendment Substantive Due Process case to hold that a regulation “went too far” to be sustained
as a legitimate exercise of the police power, and therefore effected a compensable deprivation or
“taking” of property.  See supra note   and cases cited therein.
232See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 266 U.S. at 412; Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.,
118 A. 491, 494-95 (1922) (setting forth provisions of the Kohler Act)
233See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 266 U.S. at 412; Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.,
118 A. at 493-94.  
234Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 266 U.S. at 412; Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal, 118 A. at
494 (“so far as the contractual rights of the parties are concerned, as shown by the paper titles to
the properties involved, defendant is expressly authorized to mine the subjacent strata owned by
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Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act, which prohibited owners of subsurface coal from mining pillars of
coal that provided subjacent support to surface owners.232   Mahon, the owner of surface rights
acquired by a deed from the Pennsylvania Coal Company, had invoked the Kohler Act in seeking
to enjoin the Pennsylvania Coal Company from continuing mining operations that, if unchecked,
were expected to cause subsidence.233  Complicating matters, Mahon’s deed had expressly
reserved the Company’s right to mine all the subsurface coal, and further stated that the surface
owner assumed all risk of subsidence and waived any claim for damages arising therefrom.234
it without any obligation to support the surface owned by plaintiffs”).
235
 Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. at 494.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated the familiar, controlling legal principle as follows:
“In order to serve the public welfare, the state, under its police power, may lawfully
impose such restrictions upon private rights as, in the wisdom of the Legislature, may be
deemed expedient; . . . for 'all property in this country is held under the implied obligation
that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community' . . .  [and] a statute
enacted for the protection of public health, safety or morals, can be set aside by the courts
only when it plainly has no real or substantial relation to these subjects, or is a palpable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law. If 'it does not appear upon the face of
the statute, or from any facts of which the court must take judicial cognizance, that it
infringes rights secured by the fundamental law, the legislative determination is
conclusive.'' 
Id. at 497-98 (quoting Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124)
236260 U.S. at 413.
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The Company defended on grounds that the statute effected an unconstitutional deprivation of its
property in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.  The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held, strictly on Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process grounds, that the
Kohler Act was “a reasonable and valid exercise of the police power.”235
 The Company filed a writ of error, seeking reversal of the Pennsylvania Court’s
constitutional holding.  Thus the sole issue before United State Supreme Court was, as Holmes
stated it, /			
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Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.
As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits
or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in
determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.  When it reaches a certain
magnitude, in most  if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain
237260 U.S. at 413.
238As the Supreme Court later interpreted Mahon in the 1962 case Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, “diminution of value” is a relevant factor in drawing the boundary between a
legitimate police power regulation and a compensable taking, but in itself not conclusive. See
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ( “There is no set formula to determine where
regulation ends and taking begins. Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant,
see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, it is by no means conclusive”)
239See, e.g.,  
240See Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal, 118 A. at 507 (Kephardt, J., dissenting) (deriding
majority’s broad conception of the scope of the police power through which “property may be
transferred, by the Legislature from one person to another without compensation” even though
“the limitation of power so to act was heretofore one of the chief obstacles in the way of those
favoring this socialistic principle”).
66
and compensation to sustain the act.”237
Thus, Holmes seems to be saying, there is no bright line demarcating the boundary
separating legitimate (and non-compensable) exercises of the police power from implied (and
compensable) exercises of the eminent domain power; government actions are arrayed along a
continuum, and may fall into either category depending upon the facts and circumstances of the
case.  “One fact for consideration”—presumably, only one of several, on Holmes’ view238—is the
“extent of the diminution.”
This statement is often cited by contemporary courts and commentators as Holmes’
enunciation of a novel “diminution of value” test for regulatory takings.239  I 	
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241260 U.S. at 413; cf. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal, 118 A. at 510 (stating that the Kohler
Act “transfers an independent property right to plaintiff, vesting the permanent use and perpetual
enjoyment of this right in one who is not required to pay anything for what he so acquires, and
which he may sell in selling his surface, with the increased value given it by this legislation
added”)
242260 U.S. at 413-14 (“The extent of the public interest is shown by the statute to be
limited, since the statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the
owner of the coal”). 
243260 U.S. at 413.
244260 U.S. at 413.
245Cf. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal, 118 A. at 514 (Kephardt, J., dissenting) (the
“intention [of the Kohler Act] was not to protect lives or safety generally, but merely to augment
property rights of the few; the public generally, as distinguished from this particular class, is not
interested”).  To judges of the Substantive Due Process era, such redistributive “class legislation”
fell outside the police power, see infra note   and accompanying text.  
246See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (Missouri Pac. I)
(overturning regulatory order compelling railroad to lease a portion of its right-of-way to farmers
for construction of a grain elevator on grounds that “the taking by a state of the private property
of one person or corporation, without the owner’s consent, for the private use of another, is not
67
Holmes’ eye, the Act’s restrictions on subsurface coal mining appear to be directed principally
toward protecting the private interests of a specified class of surface owners—those surface
owners who had not taken the precaution to bargain for subjacent support from the owners of the
underground coal as they clearly could have done under Pennsylvania law, and who now stand to
gain a windfall at the expense of the subsurface owners who had bargained for the right to mine
the coal.  In subsidence affecting this narrow class of surface owners, Holmes says, “the damage is
not common or public.”241  As evidence of the narrow “class” nature of the regulatory scheme,
Holmes points to the fact that the statutory prohibition on the mining of coal pillars that provide
subjacent support does not extend to situations where the mining company itself owns the surface
rights.242  Certainly, the regulation may protect one class of surface owners, and Holmes concedes
that “there is a public interest even in this, as there is in every purchase and sale and in all that
happens in the commonwealth.”243   But the public interest in such a case, Holmes concludes, is
“limited,”244 and it is advanced only at the cost of truncating the rights of another class of property
owners, the owners of subsurface coal.  To Holmes, as to other judges of that era,  that smacks of
naked redistribution, not enhancement of the “general welfare” or any genuine “public interest.”245
By the time Mahon was decided, the Supreme Court had ample precedent for striking down such
regulatory redistributions of property rights as impermissible deprivations or “takings” of private
property under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.246  As Holmes himself later
due process of law”); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196, 206-08 (1910) (Missouri
Pac. II) (overturning statute requiring railroad to build sidings to serve private grain elevators
adjacent to its right-of-way on grounds that the requirement “unquestionably does take its
property” and advances only private, not public, interests); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226
U.S. 137, 144 (1912) (overturning ordinance authorizing two thirds of property owners on a
block to establish building setback requirements applicable to the entire block on grounds that it
“enables the convenience or purpose of one set of property owners to control the property right of
others” and has no discernible connection to a legitimate police power purpose of protecting the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare).  Holmes wrote the majority opinion in Missouri
Pac. II  and joined the majority in Eubank.    In contrast, when the Court perceived that a strong
public interest was at stake, even regulations effecting substantial redistributions of property
rights were upheld.  See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (“All the elements of a
public interest justifying some degree of public control are present” in a Washington, DC
emergency wartime housing regulation limiting landlords’ rights to evict holdover tenants, and
the regulation does not “go too far”to be sustained as a reasonable exercise of the police power);
Edward A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) (upholding a wartime tenant-
landlord laws similar to those at issue in Block v. Hirsh, stating that “the existing circumstances
clothed the letting of buildings for dwelling purposes with a public interest sufficient to justify
restricting property rights in them” under the police power).   Holmes wrote the majority opinion
in Block and joined the majority in Siegel.
247See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note , at 244 (quoting HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS,
MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, ED. 108-09 (1941).
248260 U.S. at 414; cf. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal, 118 A. at 512 (Kephardt, J.,
dissenting) (“If the Legislature had desired to protect life and limb it could have required a
notice, given sufficient time in advance, from the operator to the surface owner, when mining
was to be done under his or her land,” indicating that “the real purpose of the Legislature and the
framers of the act was in the interest of property, and property alone—not to prevent the ‘terrible
menace to human life, public safety and morals’”).
249260 U.S. at 414.
68
explained in a letter to Frederick Pollock:
“My ground [for decision in the Mahon case] is that the public only got on this
land by paying for it and that if they saw fit to pay only for the surface rights they
can’t enlarge it . . . .”247
Similarly, in Holmes’ view the statute cannot be sustained as a reasonable safety
regulation because the protection of public safety could be achieved just as effectively by a simple
notice requirement248—and in any event, Holmes says, the mining company did give actual notice
in this instance, so there was no genuine threat to Mahon’s safety.249
250Mahon, 166 U.S. at 416.  See also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note, at 134 (“in Justice
Holmes’ view the difference between regulation and taking was one of degree not kind”).
251To that extent, Holmes’ sliding-scale approach to Substantive Due Process review
anticipates the Penn Central Court’s multi-factor balancing test in Takings clause adjudication,
and suffers many of the same defects.  See supra note   and accompanying text (criticizing Penn
Central balancing); infra notes    and accompanying text (criticizing Substantive Due Process
review on similar grounds). 
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252Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1907) (hereinafter
Interstate Consolidated).   Bosselman, Callies and Banta trace Holmes’ sliding-scale balancing
approach to police power adjudication back even further, to the 1889 Massachusetts case Rideout
v. Knox. See Bosselman et al. supra note , at 124-25. Anticipating Mahon by more than three
decades, Holmes, then serving on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, wrote in upholding
a regulation limiting the height of yard fences to six feet:
“It may be said that the difference is only one of degree; most differences are when nicely
analyzed.  At any rate, difference of degree is one of the distinctions by which the right of
the legislature to exercise police power is determined. Some small limitations of
previously existing rights incident to property may be imposed for the sake of preventing
manifest evil; larger ones could not be except by the right of eminent domain.”
Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (Mass. 1889) .   See also id. at 393 (“On the whole, having
regard to the smallness of the injury [to regulated property owners], the nature of the evil to be
avoided, the quasi accidental character of the defendant’s right to put up a fence for malevolent
purposes, and also to the fact that police regulations may limit the use of property in ways which
greatly diminish its value, we are of the opinion that the act is constitutional to the full extent of
its provisions”). 
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[C]onstitutional rights, like others, are matters of degree, and . . .  the great constitutional
provisions for the protection of property are not to be pushed to a logical extreme, but
must be taken to permit the infliction of some fractional and relatively small losses
without compensation, for some, at least, of the purposes of wholesome legislation.”252
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253Hudson Co. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.) (upholding
a New Jersey statute prohibiting export of fresh water to other states against a Fourteenth
Amendment Substantive Due Process challenge).  
254Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911).  See also Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J, dissenting) (warning of the “dangers of a delusive
exactness in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment” and stating that “[d]elusive exactness
is a source of fallacy throughout the law”).
255See, e.g., Sax, Takings and the Police Power, supra note   , at 40-42.  Sax places great
weight on Holmes statement in Interstate Consolidated that “the question narrows itself to the
71
*
	
'
2*

		
		
	
()
'	
/

		
	
*



'/
	
(	2
//	
	/
/*	
	(

	

	
	
	
*

/	'	
	
/+
+		*

'	
/
/
(	

/
	/


( 8<1


	"#"" *
5' 	

*
+
,-	4	

*

'F	

		



	
A5B*
*
	*/	":	


2(7//	
	
/*+
	
+	/*	/'
	'	



		

	

	(	


	
*	

+
'	


	
2(
5	+/







'




	
/	/	
	
/	


*
	

	G
'	*/
	
 %% 
	/
/( 8<:
 .
' 1	

+
' 59	
, *,
' F







+ 

	/
*	
(8<< 0

	



magnitude of the burden imposed.”  See id. at 41.  But that statement must be considered in its
proper context.   In weighing whether the regulatory mandate of reduced fares for school children
“went too far” to be sustained as a valid police power regulation, Holmes first pointed out that
provision of public education was considered a police power purpose of the first magnitude in
Massachusetts.  See Interstate Consolidated, 207 U.S. at 87 (“Education is one of the purposes
for which what is called the police power may be exercised.  Massachusetts always has
recognized it as one of the first objects of public care.  It does not follow that it would be equally
in accord with the conceptions at the base of our constitutional law to confer equal favors upon
doctors, or working men, or people who could afford to buy 1000-mile tickets”).  After having
placed such a great weight on the “public interest” side of the ledger, Holmes proceeds to
consider the economic burden placed on the railroad, and it is only once he has reached that point
in his sliding-scale analysis that “the question narrows itself to the magnitude of the burden
imposed.”  See 207 U.S. at 87.  Holmes then finds the private burden slight in comparison with
the very substantial public interest implicated in this regulation, and upholds the statute.  
256See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note , at 139 (describing Holmes’ approach as a
“balancing test”).   
257See, e.g., Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912) (McKenna, J., for a
unanimous Court) (stating that the police power “necessarily has its limits and must stop when it
encounters the prohibitions of the Constitution” but “must be flexible and adaptive,” and the
“point where particular interests or principles balance cannot be determined by any general
formula in advance”); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 356-57 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Whether a law enacted in the exercise of the police power is justly subject to the charge of
being unreasonable or arbitrary can ordinarily be determined only by a consideration of
contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected
thereby” and “involves a weighing of public needs as against private desires, and likewise a
weighing of relative social values”); Camfield v. U.S., 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (Brown, J., for a
unaninmous Court)) (citing Holmes’ Massachuseets Supreme Judicial Court opinion in Rideout
v. Knox for the proposition that “the police power is not subject to any definite limitations, but is
co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguard of the public interests”) 
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258See 260 U.S. at 414-15.
259Holmes had applied similar reasoning in the 1910 case Missouri Pac. R. Co, v.
Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1920) (Missouri Pac. II), which held that a state statute requiring the
railroad, at its own expense, to provide sidings to privately owned grain elevators along the
railroad’s right-of-way effected an unconstitutional deprivation of property under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.  Holmes, writing for the Court, concluded that the statute
served only the private interests of grain elevator operators, at the expense of the railroads.  See
217 U.S. at 207 (“Why should the railroads pay for what, after all, are only private connections? 
We see no reason”).  In the absence of a strong showing of public interest, even a modest
deprivation of the railroad’s property—the cost of a few hundred dollars incurred to construct the
necessary sidings—was sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the deprivation was
unconstitutional.  See 217 U.S. at 205 (“In the present cases, the initial cost is said to be $450 in
one and $1,732 in the other, and to require the company to incur this expense unquestionably
does take its property, whatever may be the speculations as to the ultimate return for the outlay”). 
Notice also that in the Missouri Pac. II case the characterization of this relatively modest
economic burden as a “taking” (or deprivation) of the railroad’s property was not itself a
constitutional conclusion, as in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause context, but instead was a
statement of obvious fact that served as a foundational premise for the constitutional analysis that
follows.  “Unquestionably,” Holmes says, there was a deprivation (“taking”) of the railroad’s
property, to the tune of $2,182 total, but that fact in itself doesn’t resolve the constitutional issue,
which is whether this particular deprivation was constitutionally permissible as an exercise of the
police power, or instead was a constitutionally prohibited deprivation of property without due
process.  Holmes, discerning little or no public, had little difficulty concluding under his sliding-
scale test that the regulation “went too far” and fell outside the police power, see 217 U.S. at 208
even though railroads had been required to absorb much greater costs to achieve legitimate police
power objectives.  See, e,g, Chicago B. & Q, 166 U.S. at 251-52 (holding that the railroad was
not entitled to compensation for the costs of constructing gates, an operating tower, planking and
fill, and additional operating costs associated with a grade crossing necessitated by the city’s
construction of the street across its rail line, because “all property . . . is held subject to the
authority of the state to regulate its use in such manner as not to unnecessarily endanger the lives
and the personal safety of the people,” and “it is not a condition of the exercise of that authority
that authority that the state shall indemnify the owners of property for the damage or injury
resulting from its exercise”).
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260260 U.S. at 414 (“It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the
police power, so far as it affects the mining of coal under streets or cities in places where the
right to mine such coal has been reserved.”)
261260 U.S. at 416 (“We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the
conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we assume that an exigency exists
that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain”).
262260 U.S. at 415 (“260 U.S. at 415 (“The protection of private property in the Fifth
Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken
for such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the
Fourteenth Amendment”); id. at 416 (“We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change”).
263Frost v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 601 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  In Frost
the Court invalidated on Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process grounds a California
statute that conditioned the right of private contract carriers to use public highways upon their
submission to being regulated under the same standards as common carriers.  Holmes, dissenting,
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thought the statute “well within the legislative power” as a straightforward effort by the state to
regulate business traffic on potentially congested public highways, citing Mahon as one of the
“extreme” guideposts to determine the legitimate scope of the police power.  See 271 U.S. at
601.  At the other extreme of this continuum, Holmes cited Edward A. Levy Leasing Co. v.
Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922), which had upheld as a legitimate exercise of the police power
wartime emergency New York State housing statutes that had limited landlords’ rights to evict
holdover tenants and prohibited “unjust and unreasonable” rents. 
264166 U.S. at 415.
265See supra note   an accompanying test.
266Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (“Nor can legislation of that character [i.e., police
power regulation] come within the fourteenth amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that
its real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being, but, under
the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due
process of law.”)  
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267Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887) (emphasis added).
268Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894).  
269Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
270256 U.S. at 156.
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thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear--First, that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not,
under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business,
or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations; in other words,
its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.”268
As Holmes himself put it in applying his own sliding-scale variant on this principle in the
1921 case Block v. Hirsh—a case that predated Mahon by two years—under the police power
“property rights may be cut down, and to that extent taken, without pay,”269 but it is “open to
debate . . . whether the statute goes too far.  For just as there comes a point at which the police
power ceases and leaves only that of eminent domain . . . regulations of the present sort if pressed
to a certain height might amount to a taking without due process of law.”270
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271See, e.g., First Nat. Benefit Soc. v. Garrison, 58 F. Supp. 972, 981-82 (S.D. Cal. 1945).  
The Garrison court cites Mahon for the proposition that “if a regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking,” but places that statement squarely in the context of a careful exegesis on
the nature and limits of the police power, immediately after the statement that the “police power
may be exerted . . .   only when such legislation bears some real and substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or some other aspect of the general welfare.”  58 F. Supp. at 981. 
The clear import is that Holmes’ “goes too far” language means only, and precisely, that
regulations falling outside the police power because they do not bear a “real and substantial
relation” to police power objective—for example, because like the Kohler Act they neither
materially advance public safety nor do they confer broad public benefits—will be deemed
compensable exercises of the eminent domain power.   Other pre-Penn Central cases are
consistent with this interpretation.  See supra note   (listing cases characterizing Mahon as a
substantive due process case turning on the limits of the police power.
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272Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  The majority held
that the Bill of Right guarantees of a jury trial and grand jury proceeding in criminal cases were
not made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Maxwell, 176 U.S. at
604-05.
273176 U.S. at 606 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“privileges and immunities embrace at least
those expressly recognized by the Constitution of the United States and placed beyond the
powers of Congress to take away or impair”).
274Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. at 614 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“When . . . the Fourteenth
Amendment forbade the deprivation by any state of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, the intention was to prevent any state from infringing the guaranties for the protection of
life and liberty that had already been guarded against infringement by the national government”).
275See Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 604-05 (holding that the Fifth Amendment clauses
guaranteeing rights to indictment by a grand jury and trial by jury are not made applicable to the
states, either as “privileges and immunities” or as necessary to “due process of law”).
276Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
277302 U.S. at 322.
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278302 U.S. at 323 (petitioner contends that “[w]hatever would be a violation of the
original bill of rights if done by the federal government is now equally unlawful by force of the
Fourteenth Amendment is done by a state” but “[t]here is no such general rule”). 
279302 U.S. at 324-25.
280See supra notes   and accompanying text.
281302 U.S. at 326 & n. 4 (quoting Twining)
282332 U.S. 46 (1947).
283332 U.S. at 53.
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284332 U.S. at 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
285332 U.S. at 62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
286332 U.S. at 63 (Frankfurter, J. concurring)
287See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 534 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing in dissent that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause “is made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment”)
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288Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).  The citation to Chicago B & Q was curious
in this context, for at no point in the Chicago B & Q opinion had the Court “looked to the Bill of
Rights for guidance.”  See supra notes   and accompanying text.
289Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963).
290Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965).
81

//*	(.'	
	"#$
	


	


!**


&*

2/			"#$	

'/	



*	
*/	)
		)	(
.

"#=%'2'		



	

	
 
	
	


 )	,-'/	
	
	*	

		

	+*	
*

*	,-' 

	
	

*	' 

	"#$(8%% 	


*
'*


*
/		
	"#$	)
	
/
* 	
!	/	&'/		
	)
	)	

3
/
'

'''*
*

'	

		"#$
(


'	
6
9"			
*
		)
		
+	
*/
	
 8%#
*

/			
)
	
**
*	'/		

	)	
*
'			

'( 

*

	
6
	&
		)	**

		

	

	/	
	2

	( 8#?
-			



	

	"#$
"#$?
:"
' /	E
'

	*2
	


'

291Oregon v. Mitchell,   400 U.S. 112, 129 & n.11 (1970) 
292See U.S. at 129 & n.11 (listing Chicago B & Q in a footnote as one of 12 cases in
which provisions of the Bill of Rights had been “made applicable to the States”). 
293Mitchell concerned the constitutional permissibility under Congress’s power to enforce
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of a federal statute establishing a national voting age
of 18 in both state and federal elections.  See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117.  Justice Black’s passing
reference to Fifth Amendment incorporation is introduced by way of a gratuitous argument that
Congress’s enforcement power is “not unlimited” because it may not, for example, “undermine
those protections of the Bill of Rights which we have held the Fourteenth Amendment made
applicable to the States.”  400 U.S. at 128-29.
294
 Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
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 360 U.S. at 226 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
296See 360 U.S. at 226.
297Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 155 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
298Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 411-12 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The Court has held
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against infringement by the states the liberties of . . .
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” citing Chicago B & Q) 
299City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 534 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).  Notably,
in support of this proposition Black cited not only Chicago B & Q but also Mahon and Griggs v. 
300In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (Black, J., dissenting)
301Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 358 (Douglas, J. dissenting)
302Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 380 (Douglas dissenting)
303Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 395 (Brennan dissenting)
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304Penn Central, 428 U.S. at 122. 
305See Penn. Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 271, 274, 377
N.Y.S.2d 20, 27, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept.1975) (“the line between a compensation ‘taking’
and a noncompensable ‘regulation’ is sometimes difficult to discern” but “New York City’s
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Landmarks Preservation Law is a valid exercise of its police power”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 397 N.Y.2d 914, 916 (N.Y. Ct. App.1977) (‘the
regulation does not deprive plaintiffs of property without due process of law, and should be
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power’).
306Appellee New York City’s brief argued straightforwardly that the city’s landmarks
ordinance was a valid police power regulation and therefore not compensable under established
Due Process doctrine, relying on such classic police power cases as Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, Euclid v. Ambler, and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.  See Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, Appellees’ Brief at *20-*40.  Amicus briefs filed separately by
the states of New York and California attempt to rebut Appellant’s contention that the case
involved principles of eminent domain. 
307See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, Brief for Appellants (Jan. 18, 1978),
available at: 1978 WL 206882 [hereinafter Appellants Brief], at *12, n. 10 (“Penn Central argues
here that the City of New York’s action violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); id at *6   (stating that Penn Central was seeking “equitable relief and monetary
damages, alleging, inter alia, that the action of the Landmarks Commission . . . constituted a
taking of private property without compensation in violation of due process and equal protection
of the laws”).  The twinning of “due process” and “equal protection” unmistakably adverts to the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for Penn Central’s constitutional claim.
308Appellants Brief, at *12- *43 (citing inter alia U.S. v. Causby, U.S. v. Fuller, U.S. v.
Reynolds, U.S. v. General Motors, U.S. v. Dickinson, U.S. v. Cress, Armstrong v. U.S.,
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U.S. , Olson v. U.S., U.S. v. Virginia Electric Power Co.,
Portsmouth Co. v. U.S., , U.S. v. Twin City Power Co., and U.S. v. Miller).
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309Appellants Brief at *12, n. 10.
310See supra notes   and accompanying text. 
311See supra note   and accompanying text
312See supra notes   and accompanying text
313Appellants Brief at *12, n. 10.
314Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
315Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-42 ( “though not always in precisely the same terminology, the
Court has made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment's command that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation”)
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316See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, Brief for Appellees (Mar. 2, 1978),
available at: 1978 WL 206883, at *20-39 [hereinafter Appellee’s Brief] (arguing that the City’s
action “did not deprive the owner of due process” because on traditional Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process principles the Landmarks Ordinance was a legitimate exercise of the police power,
while not responding to appellant’s incorporation argument); Brief of the State of New York,
Amicus Curiae (Mar. 6, 1978), available at: 1978 WL 206891 [hereinafter NY State Brief]; Brief
of Amicus State of California (Mar. 1, 1978), available at: 1978 WL 206888 [hereinafter
California Brief].
317See Appellee’s Brief at *16 (“The appellants, without any analysis, have argued that the
City of New York, in applying the Landmarks Law to the Grand Central Terminal, has taken
their property and must pay the appellants compensation . . . . It is our position that the
designation of the Grand Central Terminal as a landmark was a proper exercise of the police
power. Since the appellants did not establish that the property, as restricted, was not
economically viable, the complaint was properly dismissed”).
318See
319See Appellee’s Brief at *22 (“This Court has established a substantial body of
precedent setting forth the appropriate criteria for determining whether a land use regulation is a
valid exercise of the police power”). New York State Brief at *17  (“Recognizing the extreme
nature of their position, appellants seek to paint this case as one in which a different rule for
landmarks [than for other police power regulations] is established. But that is not the case. The
City's law is valid under the traditional police power rules within which this Court has steered for
decades”).
320See, e.g., Appellee’s Brief at *22 (“It is our position that appellants have improperly
confused principles of eminent domain . . . with principles governing a lawful exercise of the
police power”);  New York State Brief at *17 (“Likewise, appellants' portrayal of this as a
87
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‘taking’ case, as if it were eminent domain, is unwarranted and misleading”); id. at *21 (“The
last-ditch attempt to portray this as an eminent domain case blatantly ignores the factual findings
below and forty years of decisions broadening the police power of the municipalities, notably in
the land-use area.”); California Brief at * 4 (“Penn Central's legal analysis flows from the
premise that the actions of New York City in regard to the Grand Central Terminal constituted a
taking of private property for public use. We shall demonstrate that this is an incorrect premise.
Once the faulty nature of that premise is recognized, the irrelevance of much of Penn Central's
argument becomes apparent”).
321Rather than offering a lengthy footnote attempting to “prove the negative,” this Article
invites the reader to examine the briefs in the Penn Central case, available on Westlaw.
322Penn Central, 
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323See infra notesa and accompanying text.
324See, e.g., Adair v. US, 208 U.S. 161, 173 (1908)(“There are, however, certain powers
existing in the sovereignty of each state in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed 'police powers,'
the exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those
powers, broadly stated, and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to
the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public. Both property and liberty are held on
such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing power of the state in the exercise
of those powers, and with such conditions the 14th Amendment was not designed to interfere”).
325Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., where the Court said: “The line which in this field
separates the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise delineation.  It varies with
circumstances and conditions.”325
This indeterminacy was both the police power’s greatest virtue and its greatest vice.   On
the positive side, it left ample room for the law of property to evolve in response to changing
social needs, conditions, and understandings.   As Ernst Freund argued in his 1904 treatise, the
police power was to be understood “not as a fixed quantity, but as the expression of social,
economic and political conditions.  As long as these conditions vary, the police power must
326Freund, supra note   , at 3.
327See Freund, supra note , at 65 (“It is moreover a most significant fact that there is
hardly any important police legislation which is not questioned in the Supreme Court as violating
the Fourteenth Amendment”).
328See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, U.S.  (“the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so
conduct himself, and so use his property, as not unnecessarily to injure another . . .  is the very
essence of government, and has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedes.  From this source come the police powers . . .”); Richmond, F.&P. R. Co. v. City of
Richmond, 96 U.S. 521, 528 (1877) (prohibitions on the use of locomotives in the public streets
“clearly rest upon the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which lies at the foundation of
the police power”); Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. at 386 (“In solving doubts [about the legitimate
scope of the police power], the maxim ‘sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes,’ which lies at the
foundation of so much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful
clew.  And the law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling,
but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of the power”);
Leisy v. Hardon, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (“The police power includes all measures for the
protection of the life, the health, the property, and the welfare of the inhabitants, and for the
promotion of good order and the public morals. It covers the suppression of nuisances, whether
injurious to the public health, like unwholesome trades, or to the public morals, like gambling-
houses and lottery tickets.”)
329See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
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continue to be elastic, i.e., capable of development.”326
More ominously, however, such indeterminacy left both legislatures and property
claimants  with a great deal of ex ante uncertainty as to the ultimate scope of property entitlements
and the boundaries of the state’s reserved power to alter property rules through regulation.   Legal
uncertainty in turn invited frequent litigation,327 and left much discretionary power in the hands of
judges to determine—on a case-by-case, situation-specific basis, and without the aid of clear rules
or well articulated guiding principles—when a regulation “went too far” and overstepped the
proper bounds of the state’s police power.  
These problems were compounded by the conceptual trajectory of the police power itself. 
Originally conceived as an important but relatively narrow power to prevent public and private
nuisances through prophylactic regulation, reflecting the old common law maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non  laedes,328 the police power had evolved over the years into a broad, all-
encompassing justification for all manner of governmental regulation thought to advance “public
welfare” or “the public interest.”329
Early formulations emphasized the state’s inherent power to supplement the largely
3302 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 276 (1826).  See also THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 595 (1868) (listing examples of
legitimate exercises of the police power, including restrictions on "[t]he keeping of gunpowder in
unsafe quantities in cities and villages, the sale of poisonous drugs, unless labeled, allowing
unmuzzled dogs to be at large when danger of hydrophobia is apprehended; or the keeping for
sale unwholesome provisions").
331See, e.g., Coates v. City of New York, 7 Cow. 585 (S. Ct. N.Y. 1827) (upholding
against constitutional challenge an ordinance prohibiting interment of the dead in New York
City, stating that it “stands on the ground of being an authority to make police regulations in
respect to nuisances,” and  “[e]very right, from absolute ownership in property down to a mere
easement, is purchased and holden subject to the restriction that it shall be so exercised as not to
injure others”);  Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827) (“the power to direct
the removal of gunpowder is part of the police power, which remains, and unquestionably ought
to remain, with the States”); Baker v. Boston, 29 Mass. 184, 198 (1831) (“Police regulations to
direct the use of private property so as to prevent its proving pernicious to the citizens at large,
are not void, although they may in some measure interfere with private rights without providing
for compensation,” for “every citizen holds his property subject to such regulations”);
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851) (“We think it a settled principle,
growing out of the nature of a well ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of its
91
retrospective common law doctrines of public and private nuisance with prophylactic regulation
aimed at preventing nuisance-like injuries to the rights of other property owners or to the public
health, safety, and morals.  As Chancellor Kent explained in his Commentaries:
“But though property be thus protected, it is still to be understood that the law-giver has
the right to prescribe the mode and manner of using it, so far as may be necessary to
prevent the abuse of the right, to the injury or annoyance of others, or of the public. The
government may, by general regulations, interdict such uses of property as would create
nuisances and become dangerous to the lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of the
citizens. Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the
deposit of powder, the application of steam-power to propel cars, the building with
combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all be interdicted by law, in the
midst of dense masses of population, on the general and rational principle that every
person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private
interests must be made subservient to the general interests of the community.”330
Kent, writing his Commentaries in 1826, could not have anticipated the role the police
power would later come to play in Fourteenth Amendment property jurisprudence.  But his view
that private property rights were inherently limited by the state’s reserved power to enact
prophylactic, nuisance-preventing regulations gained general adherence in ante-bellum property
jurisprudence under the denomination “police power.”331   When this police power limitation on
may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of other having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community,” and “the
power we allude to is . . . the police power”); Woodbridge v. City of Detroit, 8 Mich. 274 (1860)
(exercises of the police power are “not generally supposed to come within the [state]
constitutional provisions against taking of private property for public use”); Dorman v. State, 34
Ala. 216 (1859) (the police power “is derived, not from a narrow interpretation of this
constitutional guaranty [i.e., state constitutional due process clause], but from a principle of the
common law older than constitutions, coeval with the earliest civilized ideas of property, that
every man shall so use his own so as not to injure another”). 
332See, e.g., California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 308
(1905) (stating that it is “firmly established in the jurisprudence of this court that the states
possess, because they have never surrendered, the power . . . to prescribe such regulations as may
be reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for the protection of the public health, safety, and
comfort; and that no person has an absolute right to be at all times and in all circumstances free
from restraint; but persons and property are subject to all kinds of constraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and general prosperity of the state”); Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 683 (1888) (“as government is organized for the purpose, among
others, of preserving the public health and the public morals, it cannot divest itself of the power
to provide for those objects, and . . . the fourteenth amendment was not designed to interfere with
the exercise of that power by the states”); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884) (“neither
the [Fourteenth] amendment--broad and comprehensive as it is--nor any other amendment, was
designed to interfere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to
legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth
and prosperity”); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Village of Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878)
(upholding prohibition on transportation of offal through  the village as a valid police power
regulation, stating  “[t]hat power belonged to the states when the Federal Constitution was
adopted.  They did not surrender it, and they all have it now.  It extends to the entire property and
business within their local jurisdiction”).
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property rights was later absorbed into Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process
jurisprudence, it arrived not as an artificially contrived “exception” to takings law, but as part of
the Supreme Court’s understanding that it was longstanding background principle of every state’s
law of property, and therefore a principle that must inform adjudication of every claim of an
unconstitutional deprivation of “property.”332
Over time, a catch-all category of “general welfare” was added to “public health, safety,
and morals” in the list of legitimate police power purposes, and courts and commentators came to
understand the police power as exceeding the narrow bounds of nuisance prevention.   As Ernst
Freund stated in 1904: 
“[M]ost of the self-evident limitations upon liberty and property in the interest of peace,
333Freund, supra note , at 6.
334See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist, v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 163 (1896) (“Statutes
authorizing drainage of swamp lands have frequently been upheld independently of any effect
upon the public health, as reasonable regulations for the general advantage of those who are
treated for this purpose as owners of a common property”).
335See, e.g.,  Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (“We hold that
the police power of a state embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or
the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety.”); Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 318 (1907) (stating that the
police power is not confined “to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly, or unsanitary,”
but “extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of its people”); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (stating
that the police power “extends to all the great public needs.  It may be put forth in aid of what is
sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be
greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare. Among matters of that sort probably few
would doubt that both usage and preponderant opinion give their sanction to enforcing the
primary conditions of successful commerce.”)
336Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1884).
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safety, health, order and morals are punishable at common law as nuisances. . . .  But no
community confines its care of the public welfare to the enforcement of the principles of
the common law.  The state . . . exercises its compulsory power for the prevention and
anticipation of wrong by narrowing common law rights through conventional restraints
and positive regulations which are not confined to the prohibition of wrongful acts.  It is
this latter kind of state control which constitutes the essence of the police power.”333
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century heyday of Substantive Due Process,
however, the term “general welfare” was usually narrowly construed to mean something like “for
the reciprocal benefit of property owners generally”334 or “for the benefit of the entire public.”335
Most importantly, the “general welfare” was thought to exclude “class” legislation that treated
like cases differently, or had the purpose or effect of redistributing rights or benefits from one
person or class to another.  Regulations of these kinds simply fell outside the police power.   
	2

	"%%:*
	 “Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying
out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects
alike all persons similarly situated” is constitutionally permissible.”336  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o justify the state in thus interposing its [police power] authority in behalf of the public,
337Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894) 
338See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 385 (1926) (“it must
be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare”); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 355 (1921) (“although the change may
involve interference with existing liberty and property of individuals, the statute will not be
declared a violation of the due process clause, unless the court finds that the interference is
arbitrary or unreasonable or that, considered as a means, the measure has no real or substantial
relation of cause to a permissible end”); Great Northern Railway v. Clara City, 246 U.S. 434, 439
(1918) ( “the state is primarily the judge of regulations required in the public interest.  Such
statutes may only be declared unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or unreasonable attempts
to exercise authority vested in the state in the public interest”).
339Cf. Mahon, 166 U.S. at      ; Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661 (“There are, of necessity, limits
beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go”).
340See, e.g., 
341See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, U.S. (legislative determinations of police power
authority “must be given great weight.  Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the
validity of the statute”);
94
it must appear--First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.” 11$
Later courts and commentators offered additional refinements on the tests for determining
the legitimacy of an assertion of police power authority: a purported police power regulation
would be presumed valid unless it was “arbitrary,” “unreasonable,” or the means chosen bore no
substantial relation to the end sought.338  Under these restrictions the police power, which operated
as an inherent limitation on property rights, also “had its limits.”339
As the primary rubric under which Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims of alleged
regulatory “deprivations” (or “takings”) of property were analyzed, the police power had real
substantive bite: it both empowered the state to regulate to achieve broad, public-regarding
purposes, while at the same time it limited the scope of that power.  Courts refused to draw bright-
line rules or clearly articulated standards to delineate the precise boundaries of the state’s police
power ex ante,340 and they professed deference to legislative authority to make that determination
in the first instance.341  A surprisingly large number and variety of regulations passed
constitutional muster, even if the effect was to place substantial financial burdens on property
342See, e.g., Mugler, Hadachek, Miller v. Schoene, Goldblatt v. Hempstead
343See, e.g., 
344
345See, e.g., 
346See, e.g., 
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claimants.342 Yet the state could not safely assume that every regulatory enactment would be a
slam dunk winner against a Substantive Due Process challenge.  Some regulatory enactments were
held impermissible, either because the means chosen did not exhibit a sufficiently close “fit” with
the alleged purpose of the regulatory scheme,343 or because the scheme was thought to draw
“arbitrary” distinctions, or to burden some for the benefit of others in the manner of “class
legislation”,344 or because courts were simply unpersuaded by what they regarded as
“unreasonable,”inadequate, irrational, or unconvincing justifications for the regulation in
question.345
Throughout this period, the term “taking” was routinely invoked as a casual synonym for a
prohibited “deprivation” of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.346  But the Substantive Due Process branch of just compensation cases did not turn
on a careful parsing of the verb “to take” or its noun form “taking.” Instead, the analysis centered
on the extent of the claimant’s property rights in light of the state’s reserved power to regulate. 
To delineate that boundary in any particular case required a careful examination of the nature of,
and justification for, the governmental action, and whether that action was fairly embraced within
the scope of the state’s reserved regulatory power—the police power.  
The spotlight thus shone directly on the central questions in property law: how are we to
understand the nature and limits of property rights in this case and in general, and how are we to
understand the nature and proper limits of the state’s power to alter and amend property rights
over time in response to important and changing social needs?   These questions were confronted
directly and candidly, in marked contrast to today’s regulatory takings jurisprudence which
supplies answers to those same questions only obliquely, through the Supreme Court’s occasional,
disjointed, and undertheorized delphic utterances on the deep interior meaning of the words “to
take” and “taking.”   Direct attention to the central issues in property regulation within a
framework that expressly acknowledged and accommodated the need for dynamic change in the
law of property as a vital social institution in a complex and ever-changing world should be
regarded a singular virtue of Substantive Due Process property jurisprudence.
But there was a dark side to Substantive Due Process review.  Terms like “arbitrary” and
“unreasonable” are highly indefinite and malleable, consequently susceptible to inconsistent
application, manipulation, and conscious or unconscious interposition of the subjective policy
preferences of the reviewing court into constitutional adjudication.  Placing broad discretionary
347See 
348See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (upholding New York statute
setting minimum prices for milk, stating that if “the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied”); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (upholding a Washington statute setting a minimum wage for women over the dissent of
four Justices who argued that on established Substantive Due Process standards the legislation
arbitrarily interfered with the liberty of contract, redistributing rights from employers to benefit a
particular class of workers); Lincoln Federal Labor Union No 19129 v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949) (construing Nebbia and West Coast Hotel as rejecting
the due process philosophy of the Lochner era, stating that “the due process clause is no longer to
be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a straight jacket when
they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive to the
public welfare”). 
349See
350Berman v. Parker, 348 US 26 (1954).
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power in the hands of reviewing courts, Substantive Due Process review led to the well-known
abuses of the Lochner era, not least the tendency of some common law judges to second guess the
political branches on fundamental questions of social policy in light of their own allegiance to
longstanding common law precepts or tacit bias in favor of private ordering.347  Eventually,
Lochner-ization led in turn to the late New Deal repudiation of Substantive Due Process as the
occasion for searching review of economic regulation of any kind.348
Arguably, however, the New Deal reaction only compounded the difficulties associated
with the police power.  As both cause and consequence of post-New Deal courts’ extreme
deference to governmental assertions of police power authority, the once-narrow concept of the
“general welfare” swelled to include almost any legislative finding of a “public interest,” whether
or not the benefit was confined to a particular class.   With unchecked expansion of one of its core
components, the police power itself became increasingly bloated, and began to lose its analytical
bite. 
Inflation of the police power, especially under the rubric of the “general welfare,” was well
underway by the early twentieth century.  In part, this reflected the influence of Justice Holmes,
whose anti-formalist resistance to categorical line-drawing led him to find some degree of public
interest in every legislative enactment.349
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“. . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
U.S. Const., Amdt V.  The Fifth Amendment applied in the District of Columbia because it was a
federal district, governed pursuant to acts of Congress.
352348 U.S. at 32 (stating that the principle that it is for the legislature and not the courts
to determine the proper boundaries of the police power “admits of no exception merely because
the eminent domain power is involved.  The role of the judiciary in determining whether that
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one”).
353See 348 U.S. at 42.
354See 348 U.S. at 28.
355See 348 U.S. at 29.
356See supra notes   and accompanying text.
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357348 U.S. at 32.
358348 U.S. at 32.
359348 U.S. at 33 (citing Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424) 
360348 U.S. at 33.
361348 U.S. at 33.
362See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964); Frank I
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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363See Sax, supra note , at 37 (“Harlan’s theory reduces the constitututional issue to a
formalistic quibble” and has not “proved able to produce satisfactory results”).
364See Sax, supra note   , at 36 n. 2 (stating that “[t]he constitutional provision at issue
here is that of the fifth amendment which provides ‘nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.’  This requirement has traditionally been viewed as incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment,” and citing Chicago B & Q);   Michelman, Property, Utility and
Fairness, supra note   , at 
365See supra notes    And accompanying text.
366See supra Part 
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367See Sax, supra note , at 38 (stating that on Harlan’s theory in Mugler v. Kansas, mere
regulation of the use of property “was not in any sense a ‘taking’ because it involved no
appropriation of property for the public benefit but merely a limitation upon use by the owner for
certain purposes declared to be injurious to the community,” a “theory Harlan apparently derived
from the literal language of the fifth amendment , which deals only with the ‘taking’ of property). 
Problematically for Sax’s account, however, Mugler was decided purely on Fourteenth
Amendment Substantive Due Process grounds, makes no mention of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, and in any event pre-dates Chicago B & Q, the case which is supposed to have
effected incorporation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause against the states.  Just as
importantly, Mugler explicitly disclaims the view that all regulations of the “use” of property
would pass constitutional muster.  See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661 (“It does not at all follow that
every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these [police power] ends is to be accepted
as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the state. There are, of necessity, limits beyond
which legislation cannot rightfully go.”).
368See Sax, supra note 39 (“Harlan distinguished innocent from noxious uses” and held that
“abatement of a noxious use is not a taking of property, since uses in contravention of the public interest
are not property”).
369See Sax, supra note   , at 37.  
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370See Sax, supra note , at 39-40 (“Within a relatively narrow area Harlan’s conceptual approach
produces not only clear-cut distinctions, but also satisfactory results,” but “[a]s the scope of
governmental regulations grew . . .  the economic impact of government regulation undermined the
rationality of Harlan’s conceptual distinctions”).
371See Sax, supra note   , at 40-41.
372See id. at 41 (“While he never flatly stated that degree of economic harm was the factor in his
theory, a reading of his opinions leaves little doubt that this was the theory he devised”). 
373See id. at 50-60
374See Sax, supra note , at 37, 39 (“Harlan’s theory reduces the constitutional to a formalistic
quibble,”and “distinguish[es] takings from exercises of the police power by artful definition of the terms
‘taking’ and ‘property’”)
375See supra Parts III and IV.
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376See supra notes   and accompanying text.
377See Sax, supra note ,.at 61 (“Since the question being asked is what sort of protection is to be
given to property, the initial task must be to develop a workable concept of what we mean when we talk
about property”); 
378See supra notes and accompanying text.
379See supra notes   and accompanying text.
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380See e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon
381Supreme Court reversals of property regulation on Substantive Due Process grounds increased
sharply during Holmes’ tenure on the Supreme Court.  While it would be unwise to attribute this entirely
to Holmes’ influence, Holmes joined the majority in most of those reversals, wrote the majority opinion
in several, and supplied the highly indefinite and arguably manipulable sliding-scale analytical
framework under which still others were decided.   Indeed, while Holmes is justly famous for his dissents
in Lochner and a number of other important Substantive Due Process cases turning on the scope of
constitutionally protected “liberty” interests, his views on the “property” branch of Substantive Due
Process do not appear to have been far outside the Lochner-era mainstream. 
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382Numerous commentators have noticed and criticized the uncanny resemblance of much of the
Supreme Court’s contemporary regulatory takings doctrine to earlier, Lochner-style Substantive Due
Process review.   See, e.g., Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 1, at   .   This Article argues that the
resemblance is no accident.  Having submerged the Substantive Due Process branch of just compensation
law into a Takings Clause now made applicable to the states, the Court has now proceeded to refashion
Takings doctrine to recapitulate some, but not all, elements of Substantive Due Process review.
383Perhaps the most egregious contemporary case is Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498
(1998), where a four-justice plurality determined that a congressionally enacted retroactive liability
scheme to fund health benefits for retired coal miners placed such a heavy and “unjust” financial burden
on a former coal operator that it effected a compensable Fifth Amendment “taking.”   As Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence and the four dissenting justices pointed out, however, this “takings”
determination was not grounded in a governmental invasion of any specific, identifiable property interest,
but instead was a general economic liability which coal companies could fund out of any assets they had
available, and to that extent was more akin to a tax than to a regulatory “taking” of any identifiable
“property.”  See 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Coal Act imposes as
staggering economic burden on the petitioner, Eastern Enterprises, but it regulates the former mine owner
without regard to property.  It does not operate upon or alter an identified property interest, and it is not
applicable to or measured by a property interest”); id. at 554 ( Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This case involves
not an interest in physical or intellectual property, but an ordinary liability to pay money, and not to the
Government, but to third parties.”)
384The Supreme Court’s contemporary takings decisions are rarely rooted in the specific law of
property of the jurisdiction in question.  Instead, the opinions are littered with pronouncements on the
“essential” and  “universal” attributes of property in general, most prominently the “right to exclude”
which the Court has declared to be the sine qua non of all property rights.  See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v.
U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that imposition of a federal navigational servitude on a
privately owned pond newly connected to other navigable channels effected a compensable “taking”
because it invaded the “right to exclude” which is “so universally held . . . a fundamental element of the
property right” that it “falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation”); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.  374, 384 (1994) (holding that conditioning permit
approval on landowner’s grant of an easement for public recreational use was an unconstitutional taking
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of the landowner’s right to exclude, “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property”).    Another prominent feature of contemporary cases, following
Penn Central, is the Court’s assessment of the impact of the challenged law on the claimant’s “distinct
investment-backed expectations.”   See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84
(finding no compensable “taking” as a result of California Supreme Court ruling that state constitution
required shopping center to remain open to free speech activities, in part because there was no significant
interference with “distinct investment-backed expectations”).  The implication is that the very same
change in the law might effect a taking if the cost to the shopping center were greater.   The PruneYard
Court made no effort to inquire into the “background principles” of California property law that might
inform the determination as to how far the claimant’s property rights extended. 
385Compare Lucas, U.S. at    , with (pick any prominent police power case)
386A fairly representative statement is that made by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1944:
“The police power is considered capable of development and modification within certain limits,
so that the powers of governmental control may be adequate and meet changing social and
economic conditions. The power is not circumscribed by precedents arising out of past
conditions but is elastic and capable of expansion in order to keep pace with human progress. It
is not a fixed quantity, but it is the expression of social, economic and political conditions.  In the
exercise of this power the legislature may enact laws regulating, restraining or prohibiting
anything harmful to the welfare of the people, even though such regulation, restraint or
prohibition interferes with the liberty or property of an individual. Neither the fourteenth
amendment to the Federal constitution nor any provision of the constitution of this State was
designed to interfere with the police power to enact and enforce laws for the protection of the
health, peace, morals or general welfare of the people.”
Zelney v. Murphy, 56 N.E.2d 754 (Ill. 1944).
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387See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (“In the realm of
constitutional law, especially, this court has perceived the embarrassment which is likely to result from
an attempt to formulate rules or decide questions beyond the necessities of the immediate issue. It has
preferred to follow the method of a gradual approach to the general by a systematically guarded
application and extension of constitutional principles to particular cases as they arise, rather than by out
of hand attempts to establish general rules to which future cases must be fitted. This process applies with
peculiar force to the solution of questions arising under the due process clause of the Constitution as
applied to the exercise of the flexible powers of police, with which we are here concerned.”).
388See, e.g.,  
389See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas (upholding state law making brewery virtually worthless);
Hadachek v. Sebastian (upholding ordinance prohibiting brickyards in residential zones, destroying most
of the value of complainant’s property); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (upholding building height
restrictions); Erie R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’rs, 254 U.S. 384, 410 (1921) (upholding regulation
requiring railroads to install costly grade crossing improvements in the interest of public safety); Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding municipal zoning ordinance); Goreib v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603 (1927) (upholding building setback requirement); Miller v. Schoene (upholding state law
requiring destruction of disease-carrying trees); Goldblatt v. Hempstead (upholding local prohibition on
operation of sand and gravel mines).
390Mahon is perhaps the clearest example.  Others include Ex parte Davison, 13 S.W.2d 40 (Mo.
1928) (overturning ordinance prohibiting sand and gravel quarries within city because it was not related
to a valid police power purpose of protecting public health, safety, morals, or general welfare);    
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391See  
392See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921) (Holmes, J.) (“The fact that tangible
property is also visible tends to give rigidity to our conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to
others less concretely clothed. But the notion that the former are exempt from the legislative modification
required from time to time in civilized life is contradicted not only by the doctrine of eminent domain,
under which what is taken is paid for, but by that of the police power in its proper sense, under which
property rights may be cut down, and to that extent taken, without pay.”)
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393Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
394See supra TAN
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395See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 249-50 (opining that if at the founding the people
had “required additional safe-guards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments of their particular
[state] governments . . . the remedy was in their own hands,” but instead they directed the Bill of Rights
“against the apprehended encroachments of the general government—not against those of the local
governments”).
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396See supra note   and accompanying text (citing cases).
397See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 423
(2004) (stating that the Supreme Court “has consistently adopted the selective incorporation approach
and it spent several decades in the mid-Twentieth Century gradually incorporating most of the relevant
Bill of rights provisions”). 
398See, e.g., Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 1, at 699 (characterizing the Court’s contemporary
Takings Clause jurisprudence as “importing due process thinking into the takings issue”). 
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399Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934)
400West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
401U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 155 (1938) (stating that in a facial Due Process
challenge to the validity of a statute, “where the legislative judgment is drawn in question,” the inquiry
“must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be
assumed afford support for it”)  
402See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (speculating on possible
legislative purposes that might be advanced by a challenged regulation and concluding that because
“[w]e cannot say that the regulation has no rational relation to that objective” it cannot be ruled “beyond
constitutional bounds”)..
403Berman v. Parker, 348 US 26 (1954) (equating “police power” with “public use” and both with
any “public purpose” or “public interest” determined by the legislature, and emphasizing the narrow
scope for judicial review of these legislative determinations).
404Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (stating that in eminent domain
law the “‘public use’ requirement is coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers” and “the
Court has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what
constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation’”)
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405U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938)
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406Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  Scarcely a major Takings Clause case has been
decided by the Supreme Court in the post-Penn Central era without an obligatory recitation of the
Armstrong principle.  See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. U.S., 535 U.S. 302, 304 (2002);
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 302, 304 (2001); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S.
687, 702 (1999); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 394 (1994); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1071; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836; First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987); Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980);  PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82
(1980); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123.  In each of the cited cases, however, the Armstrong principle
operates as little more than a colorful rhetorical backdrop; in none of these cases is Armstrong itself
called upon do any heavy doctrinal lifting.
407See supra notes and accompanying text; see also Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 249-
50 (stating that if the people had “required additional safe-guards to liberty from the apprehended
encroachments of their particular [state] governments . . . the remedy was in their own hands,” and
concluding that the Bill of Rights “against the apprehended encroachments of the general
government—not against those of the local governments”).   
408See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U.S., 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (stating that takings law
“prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his share of the burdens of government,
and says that when he surrenders to the public something more and different from that which is exacted
from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him”). 
409See supra note   and accompanying text.
410See supra note   and accompanying text.
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411See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 4-6
(1995) (asserting that fair distribution of societal burdens is both the historical basis and the appropriate
modern normative basis for takings law);  historical; Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics,
22 CONN. L.REV. 285, 306-07 (1990) (arguing that “‘occasional individuals’ are protected by the takings
clause” because it is “unlikely that such individuals can compete effectively in the political arena”);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1708
(1988) (“the problem for takings jurisprudence is to decide when an individual has borne more than his
or her ‘just share of the burdens of government’”); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just
Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279, 2307-08 (1992) (advancing a “uniformity theory” of
takings law as a prophylactic against discriminatory treatment in compensation policies, recognizing that
politically powerful groups are likely to win compensation through the political process but politically
disadvantaged groups require the protection of a formal rule). 
412See Peterson II, supra note , at 56 (stating that despite the Court’s frequent appeals to the
Armstrong principle, “the Court has made little effort to develop a principled basis for determining when
fairness requires the payment of compensation”); Glynn S. Lunney, A Critical Reexamination of the
Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH.. L. REV. 1892 (1992) (stating that the Court “has not . . . used this
articulated purpose to identify the takings factors” it uses in modern cases, with the result that Takings
doctrine “does not prevent the government from unfairly ‘forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens’”).    None of the major Takings tests devised by the post-Penn Central Supreme Court— Penn
Central balancing or its simplified Agins variant, Lucas “total takings,” Nollan “nexus,” Dolan “rough
proportionality,” Loretto “permanent physical invasion”—addresses the fundamentally comparative
question of “singling out,” namely how is this property owner (or class of property owners) being treated
in comparison with others similarly situated?  
413Cf. Fischel, supra note, at 206-07 (arguing that governments does not always look to aggregate
social welfare in allocating the costs of governmental decisions, but instead may systematically force
costs onto some property owners for the benefit of others).
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414See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29.
415See Supra Part II.
116

	''
	
(:": 	
'	
*

		
/(		
	
		+/
'*

	/
' 	+
/	/	


	*
		'''/H	
		
/'
/	*	

	



(:"<
,	'	'		
'		+

	/
'/
	
90()		
	

'
'	)%"

	


+	
(.	)
	

2	'		*


	
*+/	
*
	



	
(	
'	


	*


 
	

+
/


 /				'/			
*
	


*

+
'	*
	*

(	3
'	'*
	/	
 	


/2
H2
'
/
	' /(	3

>'
	*>		*


/**




*	/		

***	'/

	


9
	


>
/	
		
*

/	' /	
	



 ' /	
*		



	


/



	'/		
*



*+
	)%"

 




	*
2
	
>	

/*'*
			
(
	'	/+'*
+
'	


/	
	
*
*
*3/(
